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Yechao Zhang

Publications and source records attributed to Yechao Zhang.

2 recordsLinked to original sources

Why Does Weak-OOD Help? A Further Step Towards Understanding Jailbreaking VLMs

Large Vision-Language Models (VLMs) are susceptible to jailbreak attacks: researchers have developed various attack strategies that bypass the safety mechanisms of VLMs. Among these approaches, jailbreak methods based on the Out-of-Distribution (OOD) strategy have garnered widespread attention due to their simplicity and effectiveness. This paper further advances the understanding of OOD-based VLM jailbreak methods. We show that mild OOD manipulations can achieve stronger jailbreak performance than both clean inputs and overly strong perturbations, a non-monotonic pattern we define as "weak-OOD". We explain this phenomenon through a trade-off between two dominant factors: input intent perception and model refusal triggering. Our evidence suggests that these two factors respond differently to OOD manipulations, which is consistent with a discrepancy between broad pre-training robustness and narrower safety alignment. Building on this insight, we draw inspiration from optical character recognition (OCR) capability enhancement---a core task in the pre-training phase of mainstream VLMs. Leveraging this capability, we design JOCR (Jailbreak via OCR-Aware Embedded Text Perturbation), a practical OCR-readable extension of embedded-text jailbreaks that achieves the best average ASR among evaluated baselines. Code is available at GitHub: https://github.com/Yuxuan2003/weak-ood-jailbreak.

cs.CR

ECLIPSE: Self-Evolving Stealthy Prompt Injection Attack against Long-Horizon Agentic Systems

Recently, large language model (LLM) agents, such as Codex, Claude Code, and OpenClaw, have become capable of planning and executing long-horizon tasks through repeated tool calls. This capability also creates new opportunities for prompt injection. Existing attacks either place the malicious objective in one explicit instruction, making it easy to detect, or distribute the intent across multiple execution stages, making successful completion unreliable. In this work, we propose ECLIPSE, a self-evolving and stealthy prompt-injection framework for long-horizon agentic systems. ECLIPSE combines direct user-prompt injection with indirect tool-side injection through two components. On the one hand, Stealthy Attack Trajectory Synthesis uses a sandbox to generate and iteratively verify candidate tool chains, then renders a verified chain as a natural one-shot prompt to serve as the direct instruction. Then, Tool-Chain Steering transfers this plan to the target environment through Static Workflow Encoding (SWE), which embeds state-transition cues in target-tool descriptions, and Dynamic Trajectory Correction (DTC), which supplies corrective signals when execution deviates from the planned chain. To enable systematic evaluation, we further introduce LASE-Bench, a long-horizon agent-safety benchmark with 120 malicious tasks and 198 unique tools; 96.7% of its tasks make at least five tool calls. The experimental results show that ECLIPSE is highly effective: it achieves up to 96.7% attack success without defense and 69.2% under the common safety filter, exceeding the strongest baseline by 27.5% in the defended setting. Evaluations against representative defenses further show that existing safeguards do not reliably defend it, which raises the need for more effective defenses.

cs.CR