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Zhichao Gu

Publications and source records attributed to Zhichao Gu.

2 recordsLinked to original sources

Agent-Warden: eBPF-Based Kernel-Native Process-File Provenance Tracking for LLM Agents

LLM agents execute dynamically generated process and file operations that are often invisible to application-layer tracing. We present Agent-Warden, an extended Berkeley Packet Filter (eBPF)-based provenance monitor for tracking task and regular-file states across process creation, file access, and process termination. Agent-Warden provides two interchangeable state backends: a PID-keyed hash-map backend for compatible kernels lacking BPF local-storage support and a task/inode-local-storage backend that couples state reclamation to kernel-object lifetimes. The system emits incremental causal edges to user space for asynchronous graph reconstruction and applies conservative exit-triggered causal aggregation to preserve causal context for short-lived proxy tasks. In a controlled file-mediated propagation scenario, Agent-Warden reconstructed a cross-process causal chain that was absent from the application-layer trace. On x86-64 and ARM64 bare-metal hosts, the evaluated workloads showed 0.2-3.5% end-to-end overhead and 0.6-3.7% additional system CPU time. These results indicate that the prototype provides kernel-level visibility with the measured overheads in the evaluated settings.

cs.CR↗

ContractWarden: Kernel-Enforced Damage Boundaries for AI Agents via Human-Authorized Contracts

Large language model agents can execute commands, create subprocesses, and directly access files and networks, allowing prompt injection or planning errors to become operating-system side effects. We present ContractWarden, a Linux reference monitor that enforces a human-authorized damage boundary without trusting the agent or its policy suggestions. A model may propose a tri-state asset contract - allow, deny, or no_egress - but a human makes the final choice. An execution gate binds the contract to a concrete task before untrusted code runs. An extended Berkeley Packet Filter (eBPF) Linux Security Modules (LSM) data plane then enforces file and network decisions and monotonically propagates no_egress through processes, regular files, pipes, FIFOs, and supported Unix-domain sockets. All 570 runs across 19 security tests satisfy predefined return-value and side-effect criteria. On three co-located file-I/O workloads, median overhead is 11.96-12.89% in a Linux 6.15 virtual machine and 35.79-61.54% on a Linux 6.15 physical platform, lower than the evaluated frozen ActPlane baseline. The results demonstrate deterministic kernel enforcement for declared assets, supported paths, and controlled object lifecycles.

cs.CR↗