When Should Neural Data Inform Welfare? A Critical Framework for Policy Uses of Neuroeconomics
Neuroeconomics promises to ground welfare analysis in neural and computational evidence about how people value outcomes, learn from experience and exercise self-control. At the same time, policy and commercial actors increasingly invoke neural data to justify paternalistic regulation, "brain-based" interventions and new welfare measures. This paper asks under what conditions neural data can legitimately inform welfare judgements for policy rather than merely describing behaviour. I develop a non-empirical, model-based framework that links three levels: neural signals, computational decision models and normative welfare criteria. Within an actor-critic reinforcement-learning model, I formalise the inference path from neural activity to latent values and prediction errors and then to welfare claims. I show that neural evidence constrains welfare judgements only when the neural-computational mapping is well validated, the decision model identifies "true" interests versus context-dependent mistakes, and the welfare criterion is explicitly specified and defended. Applying the framework to addiction, neuromarketing and environmental policy, I derive a Neuroeconomic Welfare Inference Checklist for regulators and for designers of NeuroAI systems. The analysis treats brains and artificial agents as value-learning systems while showing that internal reward signals, whether biological or artificial, are computational quantities and cannot be treated as welfare measures without an explicit normative model.