Provable Pluralistic Alignment: Multi-Party RLHF under Offline Human Feedback
Pluralistic alignment requires learning from feedback that reflects persistent and potentially conflicting stakeholder preferences while ultimately selecting a single collective policy. We study this problem in offline reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF), where the party associated with each comparison is observed. Under a shared low-rank linear reward model, we jointly estimate party-specific rewards and perform pessimistic policy optimization under Nash, Utilitarian, and Egalitarian social-welfare objectives. We establish nonasymptotic bounds for party-specific reward estimation and the resulting policy suboptimality under offline coverage conditions. We further consider general pairwise preferences that need not admit a scalar reward representation and may exhibit cycles. In this setting, we construct a pessimistic von Neumann winner policy and derive corresponding performance guarantees. Under these models, our results provide a unified finite-sample solution to a central challenge in pluralistic alignment: learning from limited, heterogeneous, and potentially cyclic feedback, and producing a single policy with explicit collective-welfare guarantees. Our framework thereby makes preference aggregation an explicit and statistically analyzable design choice rather than an implicit consequence of pooling human feedback.