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Zimeng Zheng

Publications and source records attributed to Zimeng Zheng.

2 recordsLinked to original sources

State-Dependent Delays in Optimal Control and Hamilton--Jacobi Equations

We develop a Hamilton--Jacobi theory for finite-horizon optimal control problems governed by state-dependent delay equations. In this setting, the delayed-time map depends on the controlled trajectory itself, so that both the state and the point at which the past state is evaluated vary simultaneously. The natural state variable is therefore the entire history, and the value functional is defined on a space of Lipschitz histories. Under suitable growth, Lipschitz, and monotonicity assumptions, we establish the dynamic programming principle and characterize the value functional as the unique viscosity solution of the associated Hamilton--Jacobi equation with co-invariant derivatives. To accommodate Lipschitz histories, we introduce a notion of viscosity solution based on finite-dimensional projections generated by polygonal extensions, and prove a comparison principle in the resulting class of functionals. Under additional regularity assumptions, we derive a Pontryagin minimum principle whose adjoint equation contains advanced terms induced by the state dependence of the delay. We also obtain a generalized transversality relation formulated through the delay superdifferential of the value functional. Finally, we establish semiconcavity in the history variable and a joint semiconcavity estimate on an appropriate solution manifold.

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Mean field and N-agent games for optimal relative consumption-investment with jump risk and common noise

This paper studies an optimal consumption--investment problem for competitive agents in an \(N\)-player game and its associated mean field game. Each agent invests in an individual risky asset subject to idiosyncratic noise, common noise and downward jump risk, and the interaction among agents is induced by relative performance concerns in both consumption and terminal wealth. In the mean field limit, we characterize a deterministic mean field equilibrium in analytical form by using the stochastic maximum principle. Numerical experiments are presented to illustrate the resulting equilibrium and its financial implications. Finally, based on the obtained mean field equilibrium, we construct an approximate Nash equilibrium for the \(N\)-player game. This model is motivated by \cite{Merton1971} and \cite{Lacker2020}.

math.OC↗