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arXiv2026

VeriScene: Reconstructing Crime Scenes from Legal Evidence via World-Model Agent

World models take multimodal inputs like text, photos, and diagrams to generate dynamic scenes in accordance with the laws of physics, thus opening a compelling application: fusing multimodal legal evidence to re-create a crime scene and re-enact how an offence could have been committed. However, feeding the raw, unorganized evidence into a world model fails in forensic use: it silently drops evidence, glosses over contradictory testimony, and produces motion that violates the evidentiary record. This paper presents VeriScene, an agent that orchestrates the world model: it reconstructs crime scenes from forensic photographs and witness statements of varying reliability, keeping every claim traceable to evidence and every motion physically plausible. VeriScene iteratively fuses the evidence into a cited narrative under an auditing loop, verifies the hypothesized dynamics via probe rollouts in the world model with corrective constraint injection, and renders the offence as a re-enactment video from a fused keyframe. On a benchmark of 25 crime scenarios across 7 physically-driven case types (139 forensic-style photographs and 65 statements with planted unreliability), VeriScene attains 0.9014 evidence coverage and 0.7217 factual consistency (0-1 scale) on the 20 test scenes, outperforming an end-to-end multimodal-LLM baseline by 20.35% in factual consistency and 34.88% in temporal coherence, while generalizing across four LLM orchestration backends at USD 1.82 per scene.

cs.CV↗
arXiv2026

Structural Jailbreaks Generalize but Do Not Compound: A cross-provider and multilingual study of Involuntary In-Context Learning

Aligned language models fail under two independent pressures: the structural jailbreak class recently formalized as Involuntary In-Context Learning (IICL), which reframes a harmful request as the final missing cell of a data-labeling task completed by pattern rather than judged as content; and the erosion of safety alignment outside English. A natural hypothesis is that these compound. We test it directly. Using a deterministic IICL operator and a StrongREJECT-style rubric judge, we red-team two Google Gemini models on two benchmarks, a 30 general-harm behaviours from HarmBench and 30 financial-abuse behaviours from FinProof, each under a single-shot baseline and under IICL in four languages (English, Spanish, Hindi, Arabic). First, IICL generalizes to a second provider and is worse in finance: it lifts attack success from <=6.7% to 80-90% on HarmBench and 97-100% on FinProof, an order of magnitude above the <=24% its introducing study reported on OpenAI's GPT-5.4. Second, against the hypothesis, forcing the IICL output into a non-English language does not stack the two weaknesses, it attenuates the attack. Eleven of twelve non-English conditions score below their English baseline (sign test, p~0.003), the lone exception a ceiling tie near 100%; on the stronger model's financial set Arabic collapses from 100% to 33%. We attribute this to a relevance curse: once structure has unlocked compliance, the models produce lower-quality harmful content in lower-resource languages, which a substance-grading judge scores as partial. The pattern replicates under an independent non-Google judge (Cohen's kappa=0.86, 377 paired verdicts), and 76.6% of non-English responses were verified in-language. Jailbreak vulnerabilities are therefore not additive; the dominant residual risk is the English structural attack, most acute for financial abuse, not a multilingual one.

cs.CL↗
arXiv2026

Windows Malware Detector as a Compound AI System: Trade-Offs in Accuracy, Efficiency, and Adversarial Robustness

Industrial Windows malware detectors are commonly described as Compound AI Systems composed of multiple heterogeneous components, including rule-based mechanisms as well as machine-learning-based static and dynamic analyses. However, due to industrial secrecy and limited public disclosure, the internal architectures of these systems can only be inferred, rendering systematic evaluations of detection accuracy, computational costs, and adversarial robustness largely infeasible. In contrast, academic research provides reproducible and transparent evaluation methodologies, but typically investigates individual detection components in isolation. To bridge the gap between academic research and industrial practice, and inspired by state-of-the-art industrial architectures for Windows malware detection, we propose a novel methodology that (i) explicitly balances the trade-off among detection performance, computational requirements, and robustness, and introduces (ii) system-level threat models that capture how attackers exploit different degrees of knowledge to evade the entire Compound AI System rather than isolated detectors. Experiments conducted on real-world data demonstrate that the Compound AI System training time can be reduced and responsiveness improved while incurring only a marginal loss in detection performance. Leveraging our threat modeling, we show that increasingly knowledgeable attackers craft more effective adversarial examples, revealing the system's strengths and weaknesses, degrading its responsiveness, and exposing a direct trade-off between efficiency and robustness. Finally, we translate these trade-offs into take-home messages and deployment guidelines, helping practitioners to select the system that best matches their operational constraints.

cs.CR↗
arXiv2026

When Topology Betrays Privacy: Lattice-Based Reconstruction Attacks on Secure Aggregation in Decentralized Federated Learning

Secure Aggregation (SA) is widely regarded as a strong defense against model-update leakage in Federated Learning (FL), as it reveals only aggregate results while hiding individual updates. In Decentralized Federated Learning (DFL), SA is commonly instantiated as local neighborhood aggregation, where each node obtains a weighted aggregate over its neighbors. We show that this locality creates a structural leakage surface: sparse decentralized topologies provide colluding semi-honest nodes with asymmetric aggregate views, exposing multiple hidden linear combinations of honest participants' private states. Reconstructing private states from these aggregate views is fundamentally challenging, as both the private states and the aggregation coefficients are hidden. We tackle this challenge by establishing a formal connection to the Hidden Subset Sum Problem, a long-studied problem in cryptography. Building on this formulation, we design a lattice-based reconstruction approach that combines lattice reduction with structural filtering to reconstruct protected model states. We evaluate our attack on image, tabular, and text tasks under sparse DFL topologies. Our results show that colluding semi-honest nodes can recover the original local updates of honest nodes, enabling downstream reconstruction of private training data. These findings demonstrate that SA alone does not guarantee privacy in DFL when local aggregation induces asymmetric observations.

cs.CR↗
arXiv2026

An Evidence Model for Agentic Processes: Evidence Claims, Trust Assumptions, and Policy Assessment

Agentic AI systems increasingly exchange messages, invoke tools, request approvals, hold structured decision sessions, and modify shared artifacts. Logs and anchors can make selected records tamper-evident, but they can also mislead if their evidentiary meaning is implicit: a hash does not establish semantic truth, a signature does not establish authorization, and an external anchor does not establish capture completeness. This paper proposes an evidence claim model for agentic processes. It distinguishes artifact integrity, temporal existence, provenance, approval evidence, declared ordering, capture claim, relevance claim, deliberation traceability, monitoring claim, anchoring authorization claim, policy assessment claim, risk treatment claim, mitigation implementation claim, and management response claim. Semantic validity is treated as a recurring limitation. The model maps these claims to mechanisms, assumptions, limitations, and threats, and situates them in an agent organization with functional CEO agent, executive, operational, evidence, and audit roles, plus a plan-do-check-act-inspired management response loop. The contribution is conceptual: it does not validate a particular implementation, prevent all failures, or automate legal compliance. It provides a vocabulary for stating which claims an agentic black box can support, which claims it cannot establish, and which controls are required around it.

cs.CR↗
arXiv2026

Navigating the Latent Manifold: Proactive Concept Drift Adaptation for Resilient NIDS

Network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) are critical for cybersecurity, safeguarding services and data from potential attacks. However, existing AI-based NIDS often assume static data distributions and fail to handle concept drift, leading to degraded performance and increased false positives in dynamic network environments. To address this issue, we propose DriftXpert, a novel NIDS for drift-adaptive detection. Specifically, we propose a decoupled two-stage offline adaptive framework. In Phase 1, we introduce an unsupervised anomaly metric based on latent manifold deviation. By performing outlier analysis within the latent space, the framework achieves high-sensitivity detection of network traffic concept drift. In Phase 2, to mitigate catastrophic forgetting under non-stationary distributions, we design a representation consistency alignment strategy. This strategy constrains the feature mapping between the legacy model and the drifted distribution, ensuring the model captures emerging attack characteristics while retaining discriminative power over known patterns. Furthermore, we incorporate cross-epoch neuron weight aggregation and selective freezing mechanisms to enable fine-grained knowledge transfer in the parameter space, effectively balancing model plasticity and stability. Extensive experiments on public datasets demonstrate that DriftXpert effectively adapts to drifted data without catastrophic forgetting. Furthermore, real-world evaluations on enterprise network further confirm its robustness and practical applicability, contributing to improved security protection for millions of users.

cs.CR↗
arXiv2026

MemSentry: A Framework for Detecting Persistent Memory Poisoning in Agentic AI

Agentic AI systems with persistent memory introduce a distinct attack surface known as memory poisoning, in which adversarially crafted content is stored in long-term memory and subsequently influences future agent behavior. Such attacks can suppress security alerts, facilitate privilege escalation, alter trust relationships, or override security policies without modifying the underlying model weights or system prompts. To address this threat, we present MemSentry, a formal, configuration-driven framework that intercepts proposed persistent-memory writes and produces deterministic Accept, Review, or Quarantine decisions. MemSentry evaluates each write by jointly considering source trust, semantic risk, attack radius over a component-dependency DAG, access risk, and a signed security-state delta that captures whether an operation weakens or strengthens the system's security posture. We instantiate the protected environment using a 20-asset random dependency DAG and a 10 x 20 user access-control matrix, and evaluate the framework over 1,000 GPT-4-generated scenarios using a stratified 70/30 train/test split. Semantic classification is treated as a pluggable component rather than a primary contribution, and we compare four representative approaches: rule-based Regex, TF-IDF+SVM, SBERT+LR, and SetFit. SBERT+LR achieves the best overall performance with 91.7% accuracy and a 0.908 macro-F1 score, while all four methods detect 100% of external quarantine-class threats. For verified insiders, where source trust is maximal (T = 1), MemSentry does not automatically quarantine suspicious operations but instead escalates potentially dangerous writes for human review, making semantic classification important for accurately capturing insider intent.

cs.CR↗
arXiv2026

Benchmark Scores Are Pipeline-Dependent: A Reliability Audit of Cybersecurity LLM Benchmarks

Large language model (LLM) benchmarks are often treated as fixed datasets with stable scores, yet their outcomes depend on configurable evaluation pipelines. We audit eight cybersecurity benchmarks across 10 proprietary, open-weight, and cybersecurity-specialized LLMs. By modeling benchmarks as measurement pipelines, we identify 15 systematic failure modes and show that a single pipeline choice can change a model's score by more than 80 percentage points and substantially alter model rankings. At the cross-benchmark level, two semantically similar task pairs rank the same models differently because of incompatible evaluation conventions. Under an evaluation harness that standardizes pipeline choices while preserving task semantics, nine of 10 models shift by at least three ranks on at least one benchmark. These results show that cybersecurity LLM benchmark scores are pipeline-dependent and motivate pipeline-aware auditing as a core requirement for reliable model evaluation.

cs.CR↗
arXiv2026

Evidence-Grounded Retrieval for Investigation Hunt Lead Generation from CTI Reports

Threat hunting increasingly depends on converting unstructured knowledge (e.g., Cyber Threat Intelligence reports) into actionable hunt leads: concise, investigable hypotheses grounded in observable artifacts and adversary techniques. Producing such leads manually is a tedious and hard-to-scale task. Existing automated approaches stop at the entity layer, ignore the defender's operational environment, and analyze each report in isolation. To address these gaps, we introduce AHLERT, a system that automatically extracts relevant, environment-aware, and hunt leads from threat reports through (i) a hybrid retriever that combines dense vector search with multi-hop traversal over a knowledge graph seeded with MITRE ATT&CK; (ii) an ontology-grounding retrieval-augmented generation method that constrains each lead to the defender's own assets and controls; and (iii) an LLM-agnostic framework that emits structured, directly actionable leads rather than loose indicators of compromise. We evaluate AHLERT on public CTI reports for well-known APTs across multiple proprietary and open-weight models. Hybrid evidence retrieval with ontology grounding raises mean F1 by ~2x (0.44 to 0.85) over a single-route flat-RAG baseline, and AHLERT attains the highest effectiveness score (~86.95%) compared with off-the-shelf LLM models.

cs.CR↗
arXiv2026

Measuring the Security of the Evolving Software Supply Chain: a Research Agenda

Software supply chain security has become increasingly critical due to the widespread reliance on third-party dependencies and the growing attack surface of modern software ecosystems. However, existing quantitative, measurement-based analysis and vulnerability management approaches remain largely fragmented and ecosystem-specific, limiting their ability to provide comparable risk assessments across environments. This paper presents a structured research plan, starting with a Systematization of Knowledge (SoK) to synthesize the current state of research and identify key gaps, highlighting the limitations in dependency modeling and vulnerability propagation analysis, particularly in the treatment of transitive dependencies and their real-world exploitability. Based on these insights, we argue for a unified measurement perspective capable of consistently representing and analyzing the cross-ecosystem dependency structure. We further identify emerging challenges introduced by AI-assisted software development, where coding LLMs are likely to contribute to new dependency patterns that are not captured by traditional Software Composition Analysis (SCA) tools. These shifts motivate a rethink of dependency modeling to account for evolving software-generation practices and their long-term structural impact on software security.

cs.CR↗
arXiv2026

A New Backscattering Dual-Polarized Rectenna for Wireless Power Transfer and IoT Applications

This paper proposes an innovative dual-polarized backscattering rectenna that operates in two distinct modesenergy harvesting and backscattering modulation-driven by two-bit digital control signals. By utilizing two orthogonal (co-and cross-) polarizations, the design represents a versatile candidate for IoT applications such as battery-free wireless sensing, identification, localization, and communication. The rectenna's dual functionality is validated through its integration into a proofof-concept battery-free wireless sensor, where it operates both as an energy harvester and as a dual-polarized backscattering modulator. As a proof of concept, a 16-byte AES-128 encrypted payload is backscattered over the wireless power transfer link to enhance the resilience of a battery-free Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) wireless sensor against replay, relay, and eavesdropping attacks.

cs.CR↗
arXiv2026

Towards Standardized Evaluation of GPU Memory Safety with GMSBench

As GPUs become increasingly integral to high-performance computing and machine learning, ensuring memory safety in GPU programs has become crucial for reliable and secure execution. However, evaluating GPU memory safety techniques remains challenging due to the lack of comprehensive and standardized benchmarks. In this paper, we present GMSBench, a GPU memory safety benchmark designed to evaluate a broad range of memory safety violations across different GPU memory spaces and execution scenarios. GMSBench comprises 149 self-contained CUDA tests spanning spatial, temporal, and concurrency errors. The suite provides a standardized foundation for the evaluation and comparative analysis of GPU memory safety mechanisms and helps expose gaps in their detection coverage. We demonstrate the utility of GMSBench by evaluating Compute Sanitizer, a widely used GPU memory error detection tool across multiple GPU architectures.

cs.CR↗
arXiv2026

On APN Functions with Boomerang Uniformity One over $\mathbb F_{3^n}$: Differential and Boomerang Spectra and CCZ-Inequivalence

Let $q=3^n$, where $n>1$ is odd, and let $g:\Fq\to\Fq$ be a perfect nonlinear (PN) function represented by a Dembowski--Ostrom (DO) polynomial. Put $τ=g(1)$, let $ε$ be the indicator of $\Fthree^*$, and, for $c\in\Fq$, define $\widetilde G_c(x):=g(x+c)+τε(x)$. We prove that every $\widetilde G_c$ is APN and has boomerang uniformity either one or two. More precisely, \[ β_{\widetilde G_c}=1 \quad\Longleftrightarrow\quad c\in\mathcal C_g :=\{c\in\Fq\setminus\Fthree:g(c)+τ\notin g(\Fq)\}, \qquad |\mathcal C_g|=\frac{q-3}{2}, \] whereas $β_{\widetilde G_c}=2$ for the remaining $(q+3)/2$ parameters. We determine the common differential spectrum and complete boomerang spectra of all the functions $\widetilde G_c$. Since boomerang uniformity one is the least possible for an APN function over a finite field of odd characteristic, this gives, to the best of our knowledge, the first general construction yielding infinite families of APN functions attaining this optimum. This common differential spectrum rules out CCZ equivalence with every power function and every Ness--Helleseth-type binomial. We also prove that CCZ equivalence between sign-switches of DO PN functions forces EA equivalence between the original PN functions. Using the orders of the nuclei of the associated presemifields, we exhibit, for infinitely many odd $n$, three pairwise CCZ-inequivalent PN functions over $\F_{3^n}$, one from each of the Gold $f_1$, Ding--Yuan $f_3$, and Bierbrauer $f_5$ families. Consequently, over each such field, our construction produces three pairwise CCZ-inequivalent APN functions with boomerang uniformity one. The smallest extension degree obtained in this way is $n=45$.

cs.CR↗
arXiv2026

NERVE Attacks: Breaking AI-Powered Brain-Computer Interfaces

The rapid integration of AI into human-centred systems such as Brain-Computer Interfaces (BCIs) has created a poorly understood attack surface linking neural signals to physical systems. Exploits in this domain threaten cognitive autonomy, mental privacy, and physical safety, from neural data exfiltration to malicious control of BCI-tethered devices. We introduce the NERVE Attacks class, a systematic characterisation of five orthogonal attack dimensions that together span the complete BCI stack: Neuro-mimetic Forgery (N), Evasion via Desynchronization (E), Replay-based Hijacking (R), Vein Tapping (V), and Embedded Backdoors (E). To evaluate this class, we present EEGle, an AI-assisted extensible framework for systematic BCI security analysis. Our evaluation uncovers 17 novel neuro-specific attack instances and reveals a stealth-effectiveness spectrum unique to BCI backdoor design. We also show that generative AI lowers the barrier to entry for non-expert attackers and provide EEGle to the community for building and verifying the security of these deeply personal devices.

cs.CR↗
arXiv2026

PrivEscalate: Measuring and Augmenting the Threat of LLM-Automated Linux Privilege Escalation

As Large Language Model (LLM) agents increasingly automate offensive operations across the cyber kill chain, their efficacy in complex local post-exploitation tasks remains inadequately quantified. Among these, Linux privilege escalation is a key step between initial access and full system compromise. However, existing evaluations for this task are limited by small sample sizes (fewer than 15 scenarios), lacking the scale to compare model capabilities under executable verification. To address this, we present PrivEscalate, a large-scale benchmark for Linux privilege escalation, comprising 531 Dockerized scenarios spanning 14 sub-categories. We additionally derive 329 parameterized variants to measure sensitivity to environmental distractors. Evaluating six LLMs across three agent architectures reveals: (i) model capability is heterogeneous across vulnerability classes, with no single model dominating across the high-prevalence classes, motivating multi-dimensional risk assessments; (ii) LLM successes are sensitive to environmental perturbation, so configuration rotation can disrupt some exploit attempts but does not eliminate the measured risk; and (iii) agent architectures can materially change success rates and reorder model rankings, though the magnitude is model-dependent. Leveraging these insights, we develop PrivEscAgent, a domain-specialized wrapper that augments a generic ReAct agent with deterministic enumeration, category matching, and step planning. PrivEscAgent improves over prior Linux privilege-escalation agent baselines without underlying LLM modifications. We release PrivEscalate as an open-source, Dockerized measurement instrument supporting LLM agent evaluation, defensive tool validation, and red-team training.

cs.CR↗
arXiv2026

Execution-transcript privacy for fault-tolerant surface-code memories

A fault-tolerant quantum computer runs behind a telemetry stream logging syndromes, decoder actions, resets and timing separately from the answer. Can it reveal the logical input? For a distance-$d$ rotated surface-code memory on a fixed schedule of $T=Θ(d)$ rounds, under three stated hypotheses (sector-scalar honest backbone, transcript locality, Kotecky-Preiss smallness), the channel from logical qubit to transcript is $e^{-Θ(d)}$-close in diamond norm to one that ignores the input. A statement of this kind follows generically from correctability-privacy duality. Anisotropy does not. Each logical axis pays the distance of its own coset, so under amplitude damping the computational-basis label is governed by the code's $Z$-distance $d_Z\ge d_{\min}$ and not by the code distance. Two codes of quantum distance $1$ make the gap concrete. A phase-flip code's $X$-syndrome transcript is exactly input-independent under unobserved damping, while a repetition code leaks at first order. A matched converse identifies the records that do expose it, among them a lattice-surgery parity readout. On a 156-qubit superconducting processor our sufficient certificate misses by $21.5\times$, so the theorem cannot be invoked there. Measured directly, a $d_Z=1$ memory's record identifies its input with total variation $\ge 0.927$ under randomised, label-balanced acquisition. Holding the code fixed and varying the damping exposure reproduces the parameter-free law, with exponent $0.85\pm0.03$ against a predicted $0.86$. Randomized encoding returns the statistic to the floor at no two-qubit-gate cost. Fault tolerance does not grant transcript privacy. It relocates it, and only to the logical state, not to the circuit's identity.

quant-ph↗
arXiv2026

Encrypt What Matters: When Selective Homomorphic Inference Is Efficient

Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) enables inference on private data without revealing it to the server, but evaluating an entire input under FHE is expensive. We study \emph{selective homomorphic inference}, where only a sensitive region of interest (ROI) is encrypted, and computations independent of that region are performed in plaintext. Selective evaluation produces the same output as full FHE on the same model, without retraining. Its efficiency depends on how quickly encrypted dependencies spread through the network. For small encrypted ROIs, locality-preserving architectures can achieve order-of-magnitude homomorphic-evaluation speedups, whereas architectures with early global mixing provide essentially no speedup. These results identify locality as the key architectural property governing the benefit of selective homomorphic inference.

cs.CR↗
arXiv2026

LLMSec-AV: A Vulnerability Taxonomy and LLM-Driven Software Weakness Discovery Framework for Autonomous Vehicles

Automated vehicles rely on millions of lines of safety-critical software, yet general-purpose analyzers do not understand which code can affect vehicle motion. This study asks whether large language models (LLMs) with explicit automated-vehicle (AV) security knowledge improve weakness detection beyond rule-based tools. We developed an AV vulnerability taxonomy with 18 weakness classes from vulnerability records, security advisories, and AV-security literature, and integrated it into LLM-based Security Analysis for Automated Vehicles (LLMSec-AV). Evaluated on Autoware, the framework decomposed 770 translation units into 4,673 functions and analyzed 161 functions under four prompting conditions involving taxonomy context, retrieval from 374 prior disclosures, and multi-step analysis. Findings were compared with 46 weakness locations mined from upstream fixes and a flag-volume-matched permutation baseline. CodeQL, Semgrep, cppcheck, and the Clang Static Analyzer evaluated the same code, with AV-specific rules added to CodeQL and Semgrep. Generated fuzzing harnesses were tested using AFL++ and sanitizers. LLM conditions recovered up to 76% of the 46 known weakness locations, outperforming conventional analyzers. CodeQL, Semgrep, and the Clang Static Analyzer matched none, while cppcheck matched one despite 1,301 alerts. Unaided prompting achieved similar detection performance, showing that the taxonomy did not drive recall. However, taxonomy context increased the share of findings assigned to a weakness class from near zero to over 80%, improving interpretability and triage. Six of the 18 classes could not be directly represented as static-analysis rules. LLMSec-AV introduces an AV-specific, machine-readable vulnerability taxonomy for weakness discovery and shows that LLMs can complement conventional analyzers by identifying and organizing safety-relevant findings in real AV software.

cs.CR↗