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arXiv2026

Peer Oversight in Collective Decision Making

This article introduces peer $k$-oversight, a property of sequential collective decision mechanisms requiring at least $k$ agents to be responsible for every harmful outcome. It is shown that whenever $k$-oversight can be achieved by redistributing control over the decisions in a mechanism, it can be achieved using just $k$ agents. A polynomial-time algorithm is also presented that determines whether such a redistribution exists and, when it does, constructs one. These results establish peer oversight as a tractable design principle for multiagent decision-making systems.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2026

Fully Distributed GNE Algorithms for Multi-Robot Placement without Consensus on Multipliers

Recent machine learning research has increasingly focused on equilibrium analysis in non-cooperative games rather than solely on optimal solutions. Many such problems involve shared constraints and can be formulated as Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problems (GNEPs). For strongly monotone games, existing methods compute consensus-based variational GNEs (v-GNEs) by exchanging Lagrange multipliers. We propose a fully distributed continuous-time algorithm for shared linear equality constraints that converges without multiplier exchange and reaches any GNE, reducing communication overhead and improving privacy. Discrete-time schemes are also provided, and the method is validated on a multi-robot placement task.

cs.LG↗
arXiv2026

From the Social Choice Problem to a Collusion-Proof Tendering Mechanism for Dynamic Stochastic Projects

The VCG family and the AGV mechanism are two classical approaches to efficient implementation in the static social choice problem. In 2024, Csóka et al. showed that AGV has critical weaknesses. In contrast, the transferable-utility Guaranteed Utility Mechanism (TU-GUM) retains all the standard desirable properties of AGV while adding further ones, including collusion-proofness, because it implements efficiency in Guaranteed Utility Equilibrium. TU-GUM also applies to a more general dynamic setting with multiple extensions. Moreover, TU-GUM is a special case of an even more general and robust mechanism that combines contingent first-price tendering with the coordinated execution of dynamic stochastic multi-agent projects through a surprisingly simple rule. This paper summarizes and connects existing results from a different perspective, with some minor new observations.

econ.TH↗
arXiv2026

Reaching as Cheap as Possible in 1-clock Robust Weighted Timed Games

The value problem for 2-player games on graph generally consists in determining the minimal value Min can ensure against any possible strategy for Max. We consider here the value problem for reachability objectives in weighted timed games (WTGs) under a robust semantics. WTGs are a modelling formalism combining real-time constraints and integer weights on transitions and locations in an adversarial setting. Robustness allows for representing timing imprecisions in the measurement of delays and clock values. Robust weighted timed games have been introduced more than a decade ago: they are undecidable in general, and were quite recently shown decidable for the subclasses of acyclic or divergent robust WTGs. This paper pursues the goal of identifying decidable subclasses and establishes the decidability of the robust value problem for 1-clock WTGs.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2026

Optimal Adversarial Testing: Extracting Honest Test Results from Dishonest Test Takers

In applications, it is often required to test objects or people to determine their qualities in terms of certain metrics. However, besides being naturally noisy, the test results can be corrupted by adversarial behaviors of objects or people being tested (test takers). For example, dishonest test takers can cheat in the exams to distort the test results. With the development of AI technologies, such distortions driven by cheating using AI technologies are becoming more commonplace and severe. In this paper, we propose optimal testing strategies which can still recover needed test results even if there are cheaters polluting the results. The proposed testing strategies will optimally re-test selected group of test takers using different testing security measures. We determine the optimal testing strategies using a dynamic programming method.

cs.CR↗
arXiv2026

Multi-Winner Voting with Argumentative Ballots

We introduce multi-winner voting with argumentative ballots (MVArg) and investigate theoretical properties. As our conceptual contribution, we generalise approval ballots to argumentative ballots, thereby allowing voters to express defeasible preferences over candidates. We accordingly generalise voter cohesion and justified representation axioms JR, PJR and EJR. As our theoretical contribution, we establish several key results. First, MVArg is strictly more expressive than multi-winner voting with approval ballots (MV). Second, our notions of cohesion and justified representation are conservative generalisations of their counterparts in MV. Third, the MVArg counterpart of JR can always be satisfied, whereas the counterparts of PJR and EJR cannot always be. Fourth, although verifying whether a winner set satisfies the MVArg counterpart of JR is already coNP-hard, such a winner set can be constructed in polynomial time. All definitions, propositions, auxiliary lemmas and theorems have been formalised and mechanically checked in Lean 4.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2026

Scale-robust Auctions

We study auctions that are robust at any scale, i.e., they can be applied to sell both expensive and cheap items and achieve the best multiplicative approximation of the optimal revenue in the worst case. We first show that it is without loss of optimality to restrict attention to scale-invariant mechanisms whenever the family of possible distributions is closed under every positive rescaling. This conclusion uses no regularity or other distributional shape restriction. We then solve the two-agent, single-item problem with values drawn i.i.d. from an unknown regular distribution when only a high value bidder can receive a positive allocation. The robustly optimal mechanism in this class randomizes between the second-price auction, with probability approximately 0.806, and a markup auction that offers the item to the highest-valued bidder at a price equal to 2.447 times the second-highest value. Its worst-case approximation ratio is approximately 1.907.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2026

The Art of Calling the Winner by Asking Just Enough Questions: Competitive Preference Elicitation with Next-Best Queries

We study active elicitation of agent preferences for collectively choosing among $m$ alternatives using prominent voting rules. We focus on the next-best query model, in which an agent responds to a query by revealing their next favorite alternative, and measure the competitive ratio, which is the worst-case ratio between the number of queries made by the active elicitation algorithm and the minimum number of queries needed to reveal the winning alternative(s) in hindsight. We show that sublinear competitive ratios are achievable for many positional scoring rules, whereas every Condorcet-consistent rule has competitive ratio linear in $m$. For Borda count, we develop two complementary techniques: level-wise pruning, whose analysis extends to general concave scoring rules, and multi-scale score thresholding, which gives an $O(\sqrt m)$ worst-case guarantee for Borda. We also demonstrate strong empirical performance of level-wise pruning on real data.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2026

Horizon-Independent Contraction for Continuous-Time Discounted Regularized Mean-Field Games

We study contraction properties of non-stationary continuous-time mean-field games (MFGs) under discounting and entropy regularization. The state of the representative agent evolves according to a controlled continuous-time Markov chain, and both the state and action spaces are finite. In contrast to the undiscounted case, we show that, under a sufficiently large discount rate, finite-horizon MFGs admit a horizon-independent contraction condition, which also coincides with the corresponding infinite-horizon non-stationary contraction condition. As a byproduct, we obtain an explicit convergence rate between finite- and infinite-horizon mean-field equilibria. For each finite horizon, we further derive a refined contraction criterion from the spectral radius of a positive operator that majorizes the propagation of policy errors, and show that its large-horizon limit agrees with the horizon-independent contraction factor. Finally, we provide an explicit error bound between discounted and undiscounted finite-horizon regularized equilibria.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2026

Refundable Deposits: How to Restore Cooperation in Finitely Repeated Games

While infinitely repeated games admit a rich set of Nash equilibria, finitely repeated games typically have a much smaller and often inefficient one. We show how to enlarge this set using deposits: in each period a player may place a refundable sum with a neutral intermediary, returned when the game ends and forfeited following a deviation. Paying these deposits is voluntary and incentive compatible at every stage, so no commitment by the players is assumed, the only commitment required being that of the intermediary to a refund rule fixed before play begins. The mechanism sustains payoff profiles more efficient than those of the standard equilibria, without altering the underlying game and without transfers between players. We demonstrate it on the prisoner's dilemma, a congestion game, and a public goods game, all settings where cooperation cannot emerge in the standard finitely repeated version. We also apply it to a dynamic common-pool resource, suggesting that the construction extends beyond repeated stage-games.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2026

Approval-Based Apportionment: Like Portioning, Approximately like Committee Voting

We study approval-based apportionment, a variant of committee elections in which candidates ("parties") can be selected several times. We show that the proportionality axioms EJR, EJR+, and FJR coincide, and so do PJR, PJR+, and FPJR; that Lindahl priceability, an axiom implying core stability, is equivalent to a notion of approximate optimality with respect to the proportional approval voting (PAV) score; and that locally PAV-optimal committees are priceable. Approval-based apportionment (where a candidate receives an integer number of seats) lies between committee elections (zero or one seat) and portioning (a fractional number of seats). We formally connect portioning and apportionment by giving a construction that lifts axioms from apportionment to portioning and preserves implications between them. Several of our new implications between apportionment axioms are natural from a portioning perspective, leading us to believe that apportionment sits closer to portioning than to committee elections. None of them holds in committee elections, but several extend approximately, which makes apportionment a fruitful setting for conjecturing approximate relationships in approval-based committee elections.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2026

Distributed Places and Safe Net Reduction

Being able to find small Petri nets with the same behaviour as formal specifications of concurrent systems benefits both effective verification and practical implementation of such systems. This paper considers specifications given in the form of compositionally defined safe nets. The paper discusses a novel concept of distributed place which implements the behaviour of an individual net place. It is shown that if distributed places cover a safe Petri net, then it is possible to delete some places without changing the behaviour. Crucially, the reduction is both static and local, making it computationally feasible in practice. The resulting reduction technique is then applied to an algebra of safe Petri nets (boxes) derived compositionally from process (box) expressions. Though the original derivation can yield exponentially large boxes, prior research demonstrated that if a box expression does not involve cyclic behaviours, the exponential number of places can be reduced down to polynomial (quadratic). In this paper, using distributed places, it is show that similar optimisation can also be achieved in the case of process expressions with iteration.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2026

Networked Multi-Resource Defense Capabilities in a General Lotto Game

Ensuring the security of complex systems involves the strategic allocation of defensive resources to prevent various types of attacks from succeeding. A defender often has multiple types of defensive assets at its disposal, where it must decide how to optimally deploy their heterogeneous capabilities across different attack types. In this paper, we formulate a multi-resource allocation problem in the form of a General Lotto game where a defender possesses various types of resources. A feature that we introduce is that their individual effectiveness against different types of attacks is characterized by a network weight matrix. In our analysis, we derive upper and lower bounds on the performance of the defender, and provide numerical evidence suggesting that they are tight. For the case of two attack types, we analytically prove that the bounds coincide, establishing an exact equilibrium characterization. We then numerically compare our proposed networked multi-resource architecture to an independent-defense benchmark from the existing literature. These results highlight fundamental and tractable structures underlying multi-attack-type defense problems.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2026

Coalition Formation with Limited Information Sharing for Local Energy Management

Distributed energy systems with prosumers require new methods for coordinating energy exchange among agents. Coalitional control provides a framework in which agents form groups to cooperatively reduce costs; however, existing bottom-up coalition-formation methods typically require full information sharing, raising privacy concerns and imposing significant computational overhead. In this work, we propose a limited information coalition-formation algorithm that requires only limited aggregate information exchange among agents. By constructing an upper bound on the value of candidate coalitions, we eliminate the need to solve optimisation problems for each potential merge, significantly reducing computational complexity while limiting information exchange. We prove that the proposed method guarantees cost no greater than that of decentralised operation. Coalition strategies are optimised using a distributed approach based on the Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers (ADMM), further limiting information sharing within coalitions. We embed the framework within a model predictive control scheme and evaluate it on real-world data, demonstrating improved economic performance over decentralised control with substantially lower computational cost than full-information approaches.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2026

A composite generalization of Ville's martingale theorem using e-processes

We provide a composite version of Ville's theorem that an event has zero measure if and only if there exists a nonnegative martingale which explodes to infinity when that event occurs. This is a classic result connecting measure-theoretic probability to the sequence-by-sequence game-theoretic probability, recently developed by Shafer and Vovk. Our extension of Ville's result involves appropriate composite generalizations of nonnegative martingales and measure-zero events: these are respectively provided by ``e-processes'', and a new inverse capital outer measure. We then develop a novel line-crossing inequality for sums of random variables which are only required to have a finite first moment, which we use to prove a composite version of the strong law of large numbers (SLLN). This allows us to show that violation of the SLLN is an event of outer measure zero and that our e-process explodes to infinity on every such violating sequence, while this is provably not achievable with a nonnegative (super)martingale.

math.PR↗
arXiv2026

Sample Complexity of the Second-Best Bilateral Trade

We study the sample complexity of learning near-optimal bilateral trade mechanisms. Unlike previous work on learning simple or fixed-price bilateral-trade mechanisms, we focus on mechanisms satisfying Bayesian incentive compatibility (BIC), interim individual rationality (IIR), and ex-ante weak budget balance (WBB). In other words, our target is to design a sample-based mechanism that achieves the second-best gains-from-trade benchmark. We give matching or nearly matching upper and lower bounds in three regimes. For regular product distributions on $[0,h]^2$, additive $\varepsilon$-approximation has sample complexity $\widetildeΘ(h^2/\varepsilon^2)$. For multiplicative $(1-α)$-approximation under the same assumptions, we find that the sample complexity is $\widetildeΘ(h/(\mathrm{SB}(D)α^2))$, which is benchmark-sensitive with unavoidable dependence on the second-best gains from trade $\mathrm{SB}(D)$. We also investigate unbounded distributions under a monotone hazard rate (MHR) assumption. The sample complexity depends on the ratio $χ_μ(D)=μ(D)/\mathrm{SB}(D)$, where $μ(D)$ is the sum of the buyer's expected value and the seller's expected cost.

cs.GT↗
arXiv2026

Perturbation Sensitivity of Maximum-Likelihood Pairwise Ranking in Computational Decision Systems

Maximum-likelihood pairwise ranking is a com- mon computational mechanism for prioritization, reputation estimation, and comparison-driven decision support. Despite its broad use, the perturbation sensitivity of this estimator under structured changes in comparison data remains insufficiently characterized. We study this question as an applied-mathematics and computational-science problem in stability analysis. We for- mulate coordinated perturbation as a budgeted subset-selection problem over pairwise observations and introduce an Adaptive Subset Selection Attack (ASSA) as a scalable search heuristic for probing high-impact perturbation sets. Through experiments on synthetic and observed preference datasets, we show that MLE-based ranking can exhibit pronounced regime-dependent sensitivity: relatively small but coordinated perturbations may in- duce meaningful changes in output orderings, while the response profile varies across budgets and data conditions. By comparing ASSA with random, greedy, and randomized subset baselines under repeated trials, we characterize both the magnitude and the variability of perturbation-induced ranking shifts. These results position pairwise ranking sensitivity as a problem in computational reliability, numerical stability, and robustness auditing for engineering systems built on comparison-driven inference.

cs.LG↗
arXiv2026

Individual Rationality in Constrained Hedonic Games: Friends, Enemies, and Neutrals

We study constrained coalition formation in games induced by friends, enemies, and neutrals, under the two standard refinements of additively separable preferences: friend-oriented and enemy-oriented. We ask for partitions that are individually rational (IR), while additionally requiring exactly $k$ non-empty coalitions, each satisfying a prescribed lower and upper bound on its size. Although IR alone is trivial to satisfy for any hedonic game, the size constraints make it computationally intractable to decide whether a feasible partition exists. The two models tell strikingly different stories. Under enemy-oriented preferences, the problem collapses to size-constrained graph coloring, and its complexity follows accordingly. Under friend-oriented preferences, however, the picture is far more intricate, and is governed by the enmity structure rather than the friendships. The complexity is further shaped by two factors: how strict the imposed size requirements are, and whether relationships are symmetric or asymmetric, with several cases turning out tractable in the symmetric setting but intractable once asymmetry is allowed. Charting this boundary in terms of both classical and parameterized complexity, we provide a complete understanding of which properties of the friend/enemy structure are responsible for hardness.

cs.GT↗