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arXiv · 0901.3615

A Constructive Generalization of Nash Equilibrium

Xiaofei Huang
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Abstract

In a society of multiple individuals, if everybody is only interested in maximizing his own payoff, will there exist any equilibrium for the society? John Nash proved more than 50 years ago that an equilibrium always exists such that nobody would benefit from unilaterally changing his strategy. Nash Equilibrium is a central concept in game theory, which offers the mathematical foundation for social science and economy. However, the original definition is declarative without including a solution to find them. It has been found later that it is computationally difficult to find a Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, a Nash equilibrium may be unstable, sensitive to the smallest variation of payoff functions. Making the situation worse, a society with selfish individuals can have an enormous number of equilibria, making it extremely hard to find out the global optimal one. This paper offers a constructive generalization of Nash equilibrium to cover the case when the selfishness of individuals are reduced to lower levels in a controllable way. It shows that the society has one and only one equilibrium when the selfishness is reduced to a certain level. When every individual follows the iterative, soft-decision optimization process presented in this paper, the society converges to the unique equilibrium with an exponential rate under any initial conditions. When it is a consensus equilibrium at the same time, it must be the global optimum. The study of this paper suggests that, to build a good, stable society (including the financial market) for the benefit everyone in it, the pursuing of maximal payoff by each individual should be controlled at some level either by voluntary good citizenship or some proper regulations.

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Xiaofei Huang. 2009-01-23. A Constructive Generalization of Nash Equilibrium. https://arxiv.org/abs/0901.3615

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