Price of Anarchy for Auction Revenue

Jason Hartline; Darrell Hoy; Sam Taggart

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arXiv · 1404.5943

Price of Anarchy for Auction Revenue

Jason Hartline·Darrell Hoy·Sam Taggart

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Abstract

This paper develops tools for welfare and revenue analyses of Bayes-Nash equilibria in asymmetric auctions with single-dimensional agents. We employ these tools to derive price of anarchy results for social welfare and revenue. Our approach separates the standard smoothness framework into two distinct parts, isolating the analysis common to any auction from the analysis specific to a given auction. The first part relates a bidder's contribution to welfare in equilibrium to their contribution to welfare in the optimal auction using the price the bidder faces for additional allocation. Intuitively, either an agent's utility and hence contribution to welfare is high, or the price she has to pay for additional allocation is high relative to her value. We call this condition value covering; it holds in every Bayes-Nash equilibrium of any auction. The second part, revenue covering, relates the prices bidders face for additional allocation to the revenue of the auction, using an auction's rules and feasibility constraints. Combining the two parts gives approximation results to the optimal welfare, and, under the right conditions, the optimal revenue. In mechanisms with reserve prices, our welfare results show approximation with respect to the optimal mechanism with the same reserves. As a center-piece result, we analyze the single-item first-price auction with individual monopoly reserves. When each distribution satisfies a regularity condition the auction's revenue is at least a $2e/(e-1) \approx 3.16$ approximation to the revenue of the optimal auction. We also give bounds for matroid auctions with first-price or all-pay semantics, and the generalized first-price position auction. Finally, we give an extension theorem for simultaneous composition, i.e., when multiple auctions are run simultaneously, with single-valued, unit-demand agents.

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BibTeX RIS

Jason Hartline, Darrell Hoy, Sam Taggart. 2019-01-16. Price of Anarchy for Auction Revenue. https://arxiv.org/abs/1404.5943

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