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arXiv · 1606.03062

Procrastination with variable present bias

Abstract

Individuals working towards a goal often exhibit time inconsistent behavior, making plans and then failing to follow through. One well-known model of such behavioral anomalies is present-bias discounting: individuals over-weight present costs by a bias factor. This model explains many time-inconsistent behaviors, but can make stark predictions in many settings: individuals either follow the most efficient plan for reaching their goal or procrastinate indefinitely. We propose a modification in which the present-bias parameter can vary over time, drawn independently each step from a fixed distribution. Following Kleinberg and Oren (2014), we use a weighted task graph to model task planning, and measure the cost of procrastination as the relative expected cost of the chosen path versus the optimal path. We use a novel connection to optimal pricing theory to describe the structure of the worst-case task graph for any present-bias distribution. We then leverage this structure to derive conditions on the bias distribution under which the worst-case ratio is exponential (in time) or constant. We also examine conditions on the task graph that lead to improved procrastination ratios: graphs with a uniformly bounded distance to the goal, and graphs in which the distance to the goal monotonically decreases on any path.

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BibTeXRIS

Nick Gravin, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, Emmanouil Pountourakis. 2016-06-09. Procrastination with variable present bias. https://arxiv.org/abs/1606.03062

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