Search arXivSearch

arXiv · 1703.09870

Approval Voting in Product Societies

Abstract

In approval voting, individuals vote for all platforms that they find acceptable. In this situation it is natural to ask: When is agreement possible? What conditions guarantee that some fraction of the voters agree on even a single platform? Berg et. al. found such conditions when voters are asked to make a decision on a single issue that can be represented on a linear spectrum. In particular, they showed that if two out of every three voters agree on a platform, there is a platform that is acceptable to a majority of the voters. Hardin developed an analogous result when the issue can be represented on a circular spectrum. We examine scenarios in which voters must make two decisions simultaneously. For example, if voters must decide on the day of the week to hold a meeting and the length of the meeting, then the space of possible options forms a cylindrical spectrum. Previous results do not apply to these multi-dimensional voting societies because a voter's preference on one issue often impacts their preference on another. We present a general lower bound on agreement in a two-dimensional voting society, and then examine specific results for societies whose spectra are cylinders and tori.

Explore related subjects

Keep this discovery

Explore connections, maps & timelines

BibTeXRIS

Kristen Mazur, Mutiara Sondjaja, Matthew Wright, Carolyn Yarnall. 2017-03-29. Approval Voting in Product Societies. https://doi.org/10.1080/00029890.2018.1390370

Cite the original work for its findings. Save a collection to share your selection of sources.

KEEP EXPLORING

Related papers

Orthogonal Pairs in Maps from the Sphere to the Circle

We prove that, for any $f:S^2\to S^1$ and any $\varepsilon>0$, there exist orthogonal vectors $x,y\in S^2$ such that the length of the shortest arc between $f(x)$ and $f(y)$ is at most $π/2 +\varepsilon$. This proves a conjecture of Ghebleh from 2007 that the circular chromatic number of the real orthogonality graph is equal to four.

math.CO

Exact Area-Range Minima in the Quantitative Monsky Problem for Five and Seven Triangles

For a dissection $D$ of the unit square into $n$ nondegenerate triangles, let $R(D)=\max_i a_i-\min_i a_i, Δ(n)=\inf_D R(D).$ We prove that this infimum is attained for every $n\ge2$, and determine the exact minima for $n=5$ and $n=7$, allowing T-junctions. For five triangles, $Δ(5)=\frac{5\sqrt5-11}{8};$ equality holds precisely when three areas equal $(3-\sqrt5)/4$ and two equal $(3\sqrt5-5)/8$. For seven triangles, $Δ(7)=r_7$, where $r_7$ is the unique root in $(0,1/4900)$ of $864r^4+2160r^3-6060r^2+4972r-1.$ Every minimizer has four areas $(1+3r_7)/7$ and three areas $(1-4r_7)/7$, although its geometry need not be unique. The proofs combine finite combinatorial classification with exact symbolic and integer-interval certificates. For nine triangles, a tilted-strip construction gives the explicit algebraic upper bound $Δ(9)\le 0.0001273496861283553341\ldots,$ which is the exact minimum within that topology. Conversely, every dissection in the complete single-cap two-rail zig-zag family, with arbitrary continuous areas, has range greater than $1/3500$; hence a global minimizer must lie outside that family. The exact value of $Δ(9)$ remains open.

math.CO

Chromatic symmetric functions for annular webs

We introduce a combinatorial definition of chromatic symmetric functions for annular webs. We prove their symmetry by constructing a web analogue of the Shareshian--Wachs involution and show that they coincide with the symmetric functions associated to annular webs via Turaev's isomorphism. We then derive explicit formulas for their hook Schur coefficients. We also introduce web LLT functions, whose hook Schur coefficients admit positive Laurent-polynomial formulas. These formulas yield a combinatorial expression for the coefficients of the HOMFLY--PT polynomial of an annular web.

math.CO