arXiv · 1710.05218
Two-player incentive compatible outcome functions are affine maximizers
Abstract
In mechanism design, for a given type space, there may be incentive compatible outcome functions which are not affine maximizers. Using tools from linear algebra and tropical geometry, we prove that for two-player games on a discrete type space, any given outcome function can be turned into an affine maximizer through a nontrivial perturbation of the type space. Furthermore, our theorems are the strongest possible in this setup.
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Bo Lin, Ngoc Mai Tran. 2019-04-16. Two-player incentive compatible outcome functions are affine maximizers. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.laa.2019.04.027
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