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arXiv · 1812.07781

Non-cooperative game approach for task offloading in edge clouds

Bo Yang·Zhiyong Li·Wenbin Liu
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Abstract

Task offloading provides a promising way to enhance the capability of the mobile terminal (also called terminal user) that is distributed on network edge and communicates edge clouds with wireless. Generally, there are multiple edge cloud nodes with distinct processing capability in a geographic area, which can offer computing service for various terminal users. Furthermore, the terminal users are competitive and selfish, i.e., each user takes into account only maximizing her own profit, while conducting task offloading strategies. In this paper, we focus on the resource management optimization for edge clouds, and formulate the problem of resource competition among terminal users as a non-cooperative game, in which the terminal user who acts as the player always pursues the minimization of the expected response time for her tasks by optimizing allocation strategies. We present the utility function of the user with queuing theory, and then prove the existence of Nash equilibrium for the formulated game. Using the concept of Nash bargaining solution to calculate the optimal task offloading scheme for the user, we propose a distributed task offloading algorithm with low computation complexity. The results of simulated experiments demonstrate that our method can quickly reach the Nash equilibrium point, and deliver satisfying performance at the expected response time of the user's tasks.

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Bo Yang, Zhiyong Li, Wenbin Liu. 2018-12-19. Non-cooperative game approach for task offloading in edge clouds. https://arxiv.org/abs/1812.07781

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