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arXiv · 1901.10923

Coordinating the Crowd: Inducing Desirable Equilibria in Non-Cooperative Systems

Abstract

Many real-world systems such as taxi systems, traffic networks and smart grids involve self-interested actors that perform individual tasks in a shared environment. However, in such systems, the self-interested behaviour of agents produces welfare inefficient and globally suboptimal outcomes that are detrimental to all - some common examples are congestion in traffic networks, demand spikes for resources in electricity grids and over-extraction of environmental resources such as fisheries. We propose an incentive-design method which modifies agents' rewards in non-cooperative multi-agent systems that results in independent, self-interested agents choosing actions that produce optimal system outcomes in strategic settings. Our framework combines multi-agent reinforcement learning to simulate (real-world) agent behaviour and black-box optimisation to determine the optimal modifications to the agents' rewards or incentives given some fixed budget that results in optimal system performance. By modifying the reward functions and generating agents' equilibrium responses within a sequence of offline Markov games, our method enables optimal incentive structures to be determined offline through iterative updates of the reward functions of a simulated game. Our theoretical results show that our method converges to reward modifications that induce system optimality. We demonstrate the applications of our framework by tackling a challenging problem within economics that involves thousands of selfish agents and tackle a traffic congestion problem.

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BibTeXRIS

David Mguni, Joel Jennings, Sergio Valcarcel Macua, Emilio Sison, Sofia Ceppi, Enrique Munoz de Cote. 2019-01-30. Coordinating the Crowd: Inducing Desirable Equilibria in Non-Cooperative Systems. https://arxiv.org/abs/1901.10923

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