arXiv · 1910.04446
Passive network evolution promotes group welfare in complex networks
Abstract
The Parrondo's paradox is a counterintuitive phenomenon in which individually losing strategies, canonically termed game A and game B, are combined to produce winning outcomes. In this paper, a co-evolution of game dynamics and network structure is adopted to study adaptability and survivability in multi-agent dynamics. The model includes action A, representing a rewiring process on the network, and a two-branch game B, representing redistributive interactions between agents. Simulation results indicate that stochastically mixing action A and game B can produce enhanced, and even winning outcomes, despite gameB being individually losing. In other words, a Parrondo-type paradox can be achieved, but unlike canonical variants, the source of agitation is provided by passive network evolution instead of an active second game. The underlying paradoxical mechanism is analyzed, revealing that the rewiring process drives a topology shift from initial regular lattices towards scale-free characteristics, and enables exploitative behavior that grants enhanced access to the favourable branch of game B.
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Ye Ye, Xiao Rong Hang, Jin Ming Koh, Jarosław Adam Miszczak, Kang Hao Cheong, Neng-gang Xie. 2019-10-10. Passive network evolution promotes group welfare in complex networks. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chaos.2019.109464
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