What's Sex Got To Do With Fair Machine Learning?

Abstract

Debate about fairness in machine learning has largely centered around competing definitions of what fairness or nondiscrimination between groups requires. However, little attention has been paid to what precisely a group is. Many recent approaches to "fairness" require one to specify a causal model of the data generating process. These exercises make an implicit ontological assumption that a racial or sex group is simply a collection of individuals who share a given trait. We show this by exploring the formal assumption of modularity in causal models, which holds that the dependencies captured by one causal pathway are invariant to interventions on any other pathways. Causal models of sex propose two substantive claims: 1) There exists a feature, sex-on-its-own, that is an inherent trait of an individual that causally brings about social phenomena external to it in the world; and 2) the relations between sex and its effects can be modified in whichever ways and the former feature would still retain the meaning that sex has in our world. We argue that this ontological picture is false. Many of the "effects" that sex purportedly "causes" are in fact constitutive features of sex as a social status. They give the social meaning of sex features, meanings that are precisely what make sex discrimination a distinctively morally problematic type of action. Correcting this conceptual error has a number of implications for how models can be used to detect discrimination. Formal diagrams of constitutive relations present an entirely different path toward reasoning about discrimination. Whereas causal diagrams guide the construction of sophisticated modular counterfactuals, constitutive diagrams identify a different kind of counterfactual as central to an inquiry on discrimination: one that asks how the social meaning of a group would be changed if its non-modular features were altered.