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arXiv · 2008.11562

Optimal Strategies in Weighted Limit Games (full version)

Aniello Murano·Sasha Rubin·Martin Zimmermann
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Abstract

We prove the existence and computability of optimal strategies in weighted limit games, zero-sum infinite-duration games with a Büchi-style winning condition requiring to produce infinitely many play prefixes that satisfy a given regular specification. Quality of plays is measured in the maximal weight of infixes between successive play prefixes that satisfy the specification.

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Aniello Murano, Sasha Rubin, Martin Zimmermann. 2020-09-07. Optimal Strategies in Weighted Limit Games (full version). https://arxiv.org/abs/2008.11562

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