Search arXivSearch

arXiv · 2104.07129

On the approximation of queue-length distributions in transportation networks

Abstract

This paper focuses on the analytical probabilistic modeling of vehicular traffic. It formulates a stochastic node model. It then formulates a network model by coupling the node model with the link model of Lu and Osorio (2018), which is a stochastic formulation of the traffic-theoretic link transmission model. The proposed network model is scalable and computationally efficient, making it suitable for urban network optimization. For a network with $r$ links, each of space capacity $\ell$, the model has a complexity of $\mathcal{O}(r\ell)$. The network model yields the marginal distribution of link states. The model is validated versus a simulation-based network implementation of the stochastic link transmission model. The validation experiments consider a set of small network with intricate traffic dynamics. For all scenarios, the proposed model accurately captures the traffic dynamics. The network model is used to address a signal control problem. Compared to the probabilistic link model of Lu and Osorio (2018) with an exogenous node model and a benchmark deterministic network loading model, the proposed network model derives signal plans with better performance. The case study highlights the added value of using between-link (i.e., across-node) interaction information for traffic management and accounting for stochasticity in the network.

Explore related subjects

Keep this discovery

Explore connections, maps & timelines

BibTeXRIS

Jing Lu, Carolina Osorio. 2022-09-04. On the approximation of queue-length distributions in transportation networks. https://arxiv.org/abs/2104.07129

Cite the original work for its findings. Save a collection to share your selection of sources.

KEEP EXPLORING

Related papers

Learning in Structured Stackelberg Games

We initiate the study of structured Stackelberg games, a novel form of strategic interaction between a leader and a follower where contextual information can be predictive of the follower's (unknown) type. Motivated by applications such as security games and AI safety, we show how this additional structure can help the leader learn a utility-maximizing policy in both the online and distributional settings. In the online setting, we first prove that standard learning-theoretic measures of complexity do not characterize the difficulty of the leader's learning task. Notably, we find that there exists a learning-theoretic measure of complexity, analogous to the Littlestone dimension in online classification, that tightly characterizes the leader's instance-optimal regret. We term this the Stackelberg-Littlestone dimension, and leverage it to provide a provably optimal online learning algorithm. In the distributional setting, we provide analogous results by showing that two new dimensions control the sample complexity upper- and lower-bound.

cs.GT

Equilibrium and Infeasibility: A new solution concept for games

Addressing infeasibility in non-cooperative games has become an important topic, as many problems across different applications face this issue. In this paper, we propose a new solution concept for generalized games with possibly infeasible individual constraints. A solution is defined as the limit of a sequence of generalized Nash equilibria induced by games with penalty terms relaxing the individual constraints. Existence is established for a broad range of games and we provide conditions allowing to characterize a $ψ$-penalized solution as a strategy profile maximizing every player's utility over all her penalty minimizing strategies. A variation of Divide-the-Dollar serves as an illustrative example. We further establish the compatibility with the GNE and the solution to the Nash bargaining.

cs.GT

Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibria of Plurality Voting with Abstention: a PSPACE-Completeness Result for Restricted Ballots

We consider sequential Plurality elections in which each voter may abstain or vote for a single candidate. Each voter assigns utilities to all candidates; for each voter, this induces a (weak) order over the candidates. Ties are resolved uniformly at random, and voting has a small positive cost, so that a voter prefers to abstain when their vote cannot change the election outcome. We consider a variant of this model where, for each voter, we additionally specify a prefix of her ranking, so that she is only allowed to vote for a candidate from that prefix (or abstain). We prove that for this variant of the model, deciding whether a designated candidate is among the election winners in a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the associated extensive-form game is PSPACE-complete. This partially resolves an open problem from the work of Desmedt and Elkind [2010].

cs.GT