Truthful and Fair Mechanisms for Matroid-Rank Valuations

Abstract

We study the problem of allocating indivisible goods among strategic agents. We focus on settings wherein monetary transfers are not available and each agent's private valuation is a submodular function with binary marginals, i.e., the agents' valuations are matroid-rank functions. In this setup, we establish a notable dichotomy between two of the most well-studied fairness notions in discrete fair division; specifically, between envy-freeness up to one good (EF1) and maximin shares (MMS). First, we show that a Pareto-efficient mechanism of Babaioff et al. (2021) is group strategy-proof for finding EF1 allocations, under matroid-rank valuations. The group strategy-proofness guarantee strengthens the result of Babaioff et al. (2021), that establishes truthfulness (individually for each agent) in the same context. Our result also generalizes a work of Halpern et al. (2020), from binary additive valuations to the matroid-rank case. Next, we establish that an analogous positive result cannot be achieved for MMS, even when considering truthfulness on an individual level. Specifically, we prove that, for matroid-rank valuations, there does not exist a truthful mechanism that is index oblivious, Pareto efficient, and maximin fair. For establishing our results, we develop a characterization of truthful mechanisms for matroid-rank functions. This characterization in fact holds for a broader class of valuations (specifically, holds for binary XOS functions) and might be of independent interest.