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arXiv · 2204.04878

Semantic Information Market For The Metaverse: An Auction Based Approach

Abstract

In this paper, we address the networking and communications problems of creating a digital copy in the Metaverse digital twin. Specifically, a virtual service provider (VSP) which is responsible for creating and rendering the Metaverse, is required to use the data collected by IoT devices to create the virtual copy of the physical world. However, due to the huge volume of the collected data by IoT devices (e.g., images and videos) and the limited bandwidth, the VSP might become unable to retrieve all the required data from the physical world. Furthermore, the Metaverse needs fast replication (e.g., rendering) of the digital copy adding more restrictions on the data transmission delay. To solve the aforementioned challenges, we propose to equip the IoT devices with semantic information extraction algorithms to minimize the size of the transmitted data over the wireless channels. Since many IoT devices will be interested to sell their semantic information to the VSP, we propose a truthful reverse auction mechanism that helps the VSP select only IoT devices that can improve the quality of its virtual copy of objects through the semantic information. We conduct extensive simulations on a dataset that contains synchronized camera and radar images, and show that our novel design enables a fast replication of the digital copy with high accuracy.

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BibTeXRIS

Lotfi Ismail, Dusit Niyato, Sumei Sun, Dong In Kim, Melike Erol-Kantarci, Chunyan Miao. 2022-04-11. Semantic Information Market For The Metaverse: An Auction Based Approach. https://arxiv.org/abs/2204.04878

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