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arXiv · 2301.03635

Evolutionary Carrier Selection for Shared Truck Delivery Services

Rakpong Kaewpuang·Suttinee Sawadsitang·Dusit Niyato·Han Yu
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Abstract

With multiple carriers in a logistics market, customers can choose the best carrier to deliver their products and packages. In this paper, we present a novel approach of using the stochastic evolutionary game to analyze the decision-making of the customers using the less-than-truckload (LTL) delivery service. We propose inter-related optimization and game models that allow us to analyze the vehicle routing optimization for the LTL carriers and carrier selection for the customers, respectively. The stochastic evolutionary game model incorporates a small perturbation of customers' decision-making which exists due to irrationality. The solution of the stochastic evolutionary game in terms of stochastically stable states is characterized by using the Markov chain model. The numerical results show the impact of carriers' and customers' parameters on the stable states.

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Rakpong Kaewpuang, Suttinee Sawadsitang, Dusit Niyato, Han Yu. 2023-01-06. Evolutionary Carrier Selection for Shared Truck Delivery Services. https://arxiv.org/abs/2301.03635

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