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arXiv · 2306.13965

Boosting Model Inversion Attacks with Adversarial Examples

Abstract

Model inversion attacks involve reconstructing the training data of a target model, which raises serious privacy concerns for machine learning models. However, these attacks, especially learning-based methods, are likely to suffer from low attack accuracy, i.e., low classification accuracy of these reconstructed data by machine learning classifiers. Recent studies showed an alternative strategy of model inversion attacks, GAN-based optimization, can improve the attack accuracy effectively. However, these series of GAN-based attacks reconstruct only class-representative training data for a class, whereas learning-based attacks can reconstruct diverse data for different training data in each class. Hence, in this paper, we propose a new training paradigm for a learning-based model inversion attack that can achieve higher attack accuracy in a black-box setting. First, we regularize the training process of the attack model with an added semantic loss function and, second, we inject adversarial examples into the training data to increase the diversity of the class-related parts (i.e., the essential features for classification tasks) in training data. This scheme guides the attack model to pay more attention to the class-related parts of the original data during the data reconstruction process. The experimental results show that our method greatly boosts the performance of existing learning-based model inversion attacks. Even when no extra queries to the target model are allowed, the approach can still improve the attack accuracy of reconstructed data. This new attack shows that the severity of the threat from learning-based model inversion adversaries is underestimated and more robust defenses are required.

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BibTeXRIS

Shuai Zhou, Tianqing Zhu, Dayong Ye, Xin Yu, Wanlei Zhou. 2023-06-24. Boosting Model Inversion Attacks with Adversarial Examples. https://arxiv.org/abs/2306.13965

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