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arXiv · 2312.01018

Decentralized Finance: Protocols, Risks, and Governance

Agostino Capponi·Garud Iyengar·Jay Sethuraman
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Abstract

Financial markets are undergoing an unprecedented transformation. Technological advances have brought major improvements to the operations of financial services. While these advances promote improved accessibility and convenience, traditional finance shortcomings like lack of transparency and moral hazard frictions continue to plague centralized platforms, imposing societal costs. In this paper, we argue how these shortcomings and frictions are being mitigated by the decentralized finance (DeFi) ecosystem. We delve into the workings of smart contracts, the backbone of DeFi transactions, with an emphasis on those underpinning token exchange and lending services. We highlight the pros and cons of the novel form of decentralized governance introduced via the ownership of governance tokens. Despite its potential, the current DeFi infrastructure introduces operational risks to users, which we segment into five primary categories: consensus mechanisms, protocol, oracle, frontrunning, and systemic risks. We conclude by emphasizing the need for future research to focus on the scalability of existing blockchains, the improved design and interoperability of DeFi protocols, and the rigorous auditing of smart contracts.

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Agostino Capponi, Garud Iyengar, Jay Sethuraman. 2023-12-02. Decentralized Finance: Protocols, Risks, and Governance. https://arxiv.org/abs/2312.01018

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