The Gatekeeper Effect: The Implications of Pre-Screening, Self-selection, and Bias for Hiring Processes

Abstract

We study the problem of screening in decision-making processes under uncertainty, focusing on the impact of adding an additional screening stage, commonly known as a 'gatekeeper.' While our primary analysis is rooted in the context of job market hiring, the principles and findings are broadly applicable to areas such as educational admissions, healthcare patient selection, and financial loan approvals. The gatekeeper's role is to assess applicants' suitability before significant investments are made. Our study reveals that while gatekeepers are designed to streamline the selection process by filtering out less likely candidates, they can sometimes inadvertently affect the candidates' own decision-making process. We explore the conditions under which the introduction of a gatekeeper can enhance or impede the efficiency of these processes. Additionally, we consider how adjusting gatekeeping strategies might impact the accuracy of selection decisions. Our research also extends to scenarios where gatekeeping is influenced by historical biases, particularly in competitive settings like hiring. We discover that candidates confronted with a statistically biased gatekeeping process are more likely to withdraw from applying, thereby perpetuating the previously mentioned historical biases. The study suggests that measures such as affirmative action can be effective in addressing these biases. While centered on hiring, the insights and methodologies from our study have significant implications for a wide range of fields where screening and gatekeeping are integral.