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arXiv · 2402.03669

Distributed Generalized Nash Equilibria Seeking Algorithms Involving Synchronous and Asynchronous Schemes

Abstract

This paper considers a class of noncooperative games in which the feasible decision sets of all players are coupled together by a coupled inequality constraint. Adopting the variational inequality formulation of the game, we first introduce a new local edge-based equilibrium condition and develop a distributed primal-dual proximal algorithm with full information. Considering challenges when communication delays occur, we devise an asynchronous distributed algorithm to seek a generalized Nash equilibrium. This asynchronous scheme arbitrarily activates one player to start new computations independently at different iteration instants, which means that the picked player can use the involved out-dated information from itself and its neighbors to perform new updates. A distinctive attribute is that the proposed algorithms enable the derivation of new distributed forward-backward-like extensions. In theoretical aspect, we provide explicit conditions on algorithm parameters, for instance, the step-sizes to establish a sublinear convergence rate for the proposed synchronous algorithm. Moreover, the asynchronous algorithm guarantees almost sure convergence in expectation under the same step-size conditions and some standard assumptions. An interesting observation is that our analysis approach improves the convergence rate of prior synchronous distributed forward-backward-based algorithms. Finally, the viability and performance of the proposed algorithms are demonstrated by numerical studies on the networked Cournot competition.

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BibTeXRIS

Huaqing Li, Liang Ran, Lifeng Zheng, Zhe Li, Jinhui Hu, Jun Li, Tingwen Huang. 2024-02-11. Distributed Generalized Nash Equilibria Seeking Algorithms Involving Synchronous and Asynchronous Schemes. https://arxiv.org/abs/2402.03669

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