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arXiv · 2402.04590

Concurrent Strategies on Games with Algebras

Abstract

Probabilistic concurrent/distributed strategies have so far not been investigated thoroughly in the context of imperfect information, where the Player has only partial knowledge of the moves made by the Opponent. In a situation where the Player and Opponent can make concurrent moves according to the game, and the Player cannot see the move of the Opponent, the move of the Player should be probabilistically independent of the move of the Opponent. What has been achieved is showing a bijection between strategies on a game with algebra and strategies on a regular (albeit more complex) game. We also succeeded in showing the results holds with neutral events. However it is still unclear if a well-formed bicategory of concurrent games with algebras can be defined. Our attempts to compose these strategies while managing the added structure didn't pan out. Concerning the other classic extensions of concurrent games the first results we presented show promise of a more general usage of games with algebra.

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BibTeXRIS

Sacha Huriot-Tattegrain, Glynn Winskel. 2024-02-07. Concurrent Strategies on Games with Algebras. https://arxiv.org/abs/2402.04590

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