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arXiv · 2403.16416

How Reliable is Your Simulator? Analysis on the Limitations of Current LLM-based User Simulators for Conversational Recommendation

Abstract

Conversational Recommender System (CRS) interacts with users through natural language to understand their preferences and provide personalized recommendations in real-time. CRS has demonstrated significant potential, prompting researchers to address the development of more realistic and reliable user simulators as a key focus. Recently, the capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) have attracted a lot of attention in various fields. Simultaneously, efforts are underway to construct user simulators based on LLMs. While these works showcase innovation, they also come with certain limitations that require attention. In this work, we aim to analyze the limitations of using LLMs in constructing user simulators for CRS, to guide future research. To achieve this goal, we conduct analytical validation on the notable work, iEvaLM. Through multiple experiments on two widely-used datasets in the field of conversational recommendation, we highlight several issues with the current evaluation methods for user simulators based on LLMs: (1) Data leakage, which occurs in conversational history and the user simulator's replies, results in inflated evaluation results. (2) The success of CRS recommendations depends more on the availability and quality of conversational history than on the responses from user simulators. (3) Controlling the output of the user simulator through a single prompt template proves challenging. To overcome these limitations, we propose SimpleUserSim, employing a straightforward strategy to guide the topic toward the target items. Our study validates the ability of CRS models to utilize the interaction information, significantly improving the recommendation results.

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BibTeXRIS

Lixi Zhu, Xiaowen Huang, Jitao Sang. 2024-03-25. How Reliable is Your Simulator? Analysis on the Limitations of Current LLM-based User Simulators for Conversational Recommendation. https://arxiv.org/abs/2403.16416

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