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arXiv · 2403.18920

CPR: Retrieval Augmented Generation for Copyright Protection

Abstract

Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG) is emerging as a flexible and robust technique to adapt models to private users data without training, to handle credit attribution, and to allow efficient machine unlearning at scale. However, RAG techniques for image generation may lead to parts of the retrieved samples being copied in the model's output. To reduce risks of leaking private information contained in the retrieved set, we introduce Copy-Protected generation with Retrieval (CPR), a new method for RAG with strong copyright protection guarantees in a mixed-private setting for diffusion models.CPR allows to condition the output of diffusion models on a set of retrieved images, while also guaranteeing that unique identifiable information about those example is not exposed in the generated outputs. In particular, it does so by sampling from a mixture of public (safe) distribution and private (user) distribution by merging their diffusion scores at inference. We prove that CPR satisfies Near Access Freeness (NAF) which bounds the amount of information an attacker may be able to extract from the generated images. We provide two algorithms for copyright protection, CPR-KL and CPR-Choose. Unlike previously proposed rejection-sampling-based NAF methods, our methods enable efficient copyright-protected sampling with a single run of backward diffusion. We show that our method can be applied to any pre-trained conditional diffusion model, such as Stable Diffusion or unCLIP. In particular, we empirically show that applying CPR on top of unCLIP improves quality and text-to-image alignment of the generated results (81.4 to 83.17 on TIFA benchmark), while enabling credit attribution, copy-right protection, and deterministic, constant time, unlearning.

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BibTeXRIS

Aditya Golatkar, Alessandro Achille, Luca Zancato, Yu-Xiang Wang, Ashwin Swaminathan, Stefano Soatto. 2024-03-27. CPR: Retrieval Augmented Generation for Copyright Protection. https://arxiv.org/abs/2403.18920

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