Search arXivSearch

arXiv · 2404.11853

Oracle-Augmented Prophet Inequalities

Abstract

In the classical prophet inequality settings, a gambler is given a sequence of $n$ random variables $X_1, \dots, X_n$, taken from known distributions, observes their values in this (potentially adversarial) order, and select one of them, immediately after it is being observed, so that its value is as high as possible. The classical \emph{prophet inequality} shows a strategy that guarantees a value at least half of that an omniscience prophet that picks the maximum, and this ratio is optimal. Here, we generalize the prophet inequality, allowing the gambler some additional information about the future that is otherwise privy only to the prophet. Specifically, at any point in the process, the gambler is allowed to query an oracle $\mathcal{O}$. The oracle responds with a single bit answer: YES if the current realization is greater than the remaining realizations, and NO otherwise. We show that the oracle model with $m$ oracle calls is equivalent to the \textsc{Top-$1$-of-$(m+1)$} model when the objective is maximizing the probability of selecting the maximum. This equivalence fails to hold when the objective is maximizing the competitive ratio, but we still show that any algorithm for the oracle model implies an equivalent competitive ratio for the \textsc{Top-$1$-of-$(m+1)$} model. We resolve the oracle model for any $m$, giving tight lower and upper bound on the best possible competitive ratio compared to an almighty adversary. As a consequence, we provide new results as well as improvements on known results for the \textsc{Top-$1$-of-$m$} model.

Explore related subjects

Keep this discovery

Explore connections, maps & timelines

BibTeXRIS

Sariel Har-Peled, Elfarouk Harb, Vasilis Livanos. 2024-04-18. Oracle-Augmented Prophet Inequalities. https://arxiv.org/abs/2404.11853

Cite the original work for its findings. Save a collection to share your selection of sources.

KEEP EXPLORING

Related papers

Learning in Structured Stackelberg Games

We initiate the study of structured Stackelberg games, a novel form of strategic interaction between a leader and a follower where contextual information can be predictive of the follower's (unknown) type. Motivated by applications such as security games and AI safety, we show how this additional structure can help the leader learn a utility-maximizing policy in both the online and distributional settings. In the online setting, we first prove that standard learning-theoretic measures of complexity do not characterize the difficulty of the leader's learning task. Notably, we find that there exists a learning-theoretic measure of complexity, analogous to the Littlestone dimension in online classification, that tightly characterizes the leader's instance-optimal regret. We term this the Stackelberg-Littlestone dimension, and leverage it to provide a provably optimal online learning algorithm. In the distributional setting, we provide analogous results by showing that two new dimensions control the sample complexity upper- and lower-bound.

cs.GT

Equilibrium and Infeasibility: A new solution concept for games

Addressing infeasibility in non-cooperative games has become an important topic, as many problems across different applications face this issue. In this paper, we propose a new solution concept for generalized games with possibly infeasible individual constraints. A solution is defined as the limit of a sequence of generalized Nash equilibria induced by games with penalty terms relaxing the individual constraints. Existence is established for a broad range of games and we provide conditions allowing to characterize a $ψ$-penalized solution as a strategy profile maximizing every player's utility over all her penalty minimizing strategies. A variation of Divide-the-Dollar serves as an illustrative example. We further establish the compatibility with the GNE and the solution to the Nash bargaining.

cs.GT

Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibria of Plurality Voting with Abstention: a PSPACE-Completeness Result for Restricted Ballots

We consider sequential Plurality elections in which each voter may abstain or vote for a single candidate. Each voter assigns utilities to all candidates; for each voter, this induces a (weak) order over the candidates. Ties are resolved uniformly at random, and voting has a small positive cost, so that a voter prefers to abstain when their vote cannot change the election outcome. We consider a variant of this model where, for each voter, we additionally specify a prefix of her ranking, so that she is only allowed to vote for a candidate from that prefix (or abstain). We prove that for this variant of the model, deciding whether a designated candidate is among the election winners in a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the associated extensive-form game is PSPACE-complete. This partially resolves an open problem from the work of Desmedt and Elkind [2010].

cs.GT