Search arXiv⌕ Search
Home/Archive/arXiv

arXiv · 2411.08320

Responsible AI in Construction Safety: Systematic Evaluation of Large Language Models and Prompt Engineering

Farouq Sammour·Jia Xu·Xi Wang·Mo Hu·Zhenyu Zhang
View original source ↗Read source document ↗Export metadata ↓

Abstract

Construction remains one of the most hazardous sectors. Recent advancements in AI, particularly Large Language Models (LLMs), offer promising opportunities for enhancing workplace safety. However, responsible integration of LLMs requires systematic evaluation, as deploying them without understanding their capabilities and limitations risks generating inaccurate information, fostering misplaced confidence, and compromising worker safety. This study evaluates the performance of two widely used LLMs, GPT-3.5 and GPT-4o, across three standardized exams administered by the Board of Certified Safety Professionals (BCSP). Using 385 questions spanning seven safety knowledge areas, the study analyzes the models' accuracy, consistency, and reliability. Results show that both models consistently exceed the BCSP benchmark, with GPT-4o achieving an accuracy rate of 84.6% and GPT-3.5 reaching 73.8%. Both models demonstrate strengths in safety management systems and hazard identification and control, but exhibit weaknesses in science, mathematics, emergency response, and fire prevention. An error analysis identifies four primary limitations affecting LLM performance: lack of knowledge, reasoning flaws, memory issues, and calculation errors. Our study also highlights the impact of prompt engineering strategies, with variations in accuracy reaching 13.5% for GPT-3.5 and 7.9% for GPT-4o. However, no single prompt configuration proves universally effective. This research advances knowledge in three ways: by identifying areas where LLMs can support safety practices and where human oversight remains essential, by offering practical insights into improving LLM implementation through prompt engineering, and by providing evidence-based direction for future research and development. These contributions support the responsible integration of AI in construction safety management toward achieving zero injuries.

Explore related subjects

cs.AI

Keep this discovery

Explore connections, maps & timelines

BibTeXRIS

Farouq Sammour, Jia Xu, Xi Wang, Mo Hu, Zhenyu Zhang. 2024-11-13. Responsible AI in Construction Safety: Systematic Evaluation of Large Language Models and Prompt Engineering. https://arxiv.org/abs/2411.08320

Cite the original work for its findings. Save a collection to share your selection of sources.

KEEP EXPLORING

Related papers

arXiv2026

Memory-Free Continual Learning with Null Space Adaptation for Zero-Shot Vision-Language Models

Pre-trained vision-language models (VLMs), such as CLIP, have demonstrated remarkable zero-shot generalization, enabling deployment in a wide range of real-world tasks without additional task-specific training. However, in real deployment scenarios with evolving environments or emerging classes, these models inevitably face distributional shifts and novel tasks. In such contexts, static zero-shot capabilities are insufficient, and there is a growing need for continual learning methods that allow models to adapt over time while avoiding catastrophic forgetting. We introduce NuSA-CL (Null Space Adaptation for Continual Learning), a lightweight memory-free continual learning framework designed to address this challenge. NuSA-CL employs low-rank adaptation and constrains task-specific weight updates to lie within an approximate null space of the model's current parameters. This strategy minimizes interference with previously acquired knowledge, effectively preserving the zero-shot capabilities of the original model. Unlike methods relying on replay buffers or costly distillation, NuSA-CL imposes minimal computational and memory overhead, making it practical for deployment in resource-constrained, real-world continual learning environments. Experiments show that our framework not only effectively preserves zero-shot transfer capabilities but also achieves highly competitive performance on continual learning benchmarks. These results position NuSA-CL as a practical and scalable solution for continually evolving zero-shot VLMs in real-world applications.

cs.AI↗
arXiv2026

VeRA: Renewing Reasoning Benchmarks with Executable Specifications

Reasoning benchmarks need renewal along two axes: freshness and headroom. VeRA makes both executable and auditable by turning each item into a task family: a natural-language template, an input generator, and a deterministic answer program. VeRA-E draws fresh instances within a family; VeRA-H modifies the family toward harder tasks; and VeRA-H Pro selects one judge-ranked candidate from up to five validated proposals per seed. Execution checks, seed anchoring, answer discrimination, and independent human solving validate specifications and items. Accepted programs generate further labeled instances through local computation. Across 16 models, AIME-2024 accuracy decreases from 84.46% on seeds to 70.25% on VeRA-E variants, exposing a gap between fixed-item success and fresh-instance robustness. On AIME-2024-II, the human-audited VeRA-H Pro release lowers accuracy from 84.91% to 58.57%. Across the three hardening sources, H Pro has lower mean accuracy than H. On AMO-Bench, both releases average higher accuracy than the seeds under the evaluated budget. Initial auditing accepts 75.4% of hardened candidates; targeted repair raises usable yield to 95.1%. Executable families thus support repeatable benchmark renewal, with validation improving task quality and selection shaping the delivered challenge.

cs.AI↗
arXiv2026

When can we trust untrusted monitoring? A safety case sketch across collusion strategies

AIs are increasingly being deployed with greater autonomy and capabilities, which increases the risk that a misaligned AI may be able to cause catastrophic harm. Untrusted monitoring -- using one untrusted model to oversee another -- is one approach to reducing risk. Justifying the safety of an untrusted monitoring deployment is challenging because developers cannot safely deploy a misaligned model to test their protocol directly. In this paper, we develop upon existing methods for rigorously demonstrating safety based on pre-deployment testing. We relax assumptions that previous AI control research made about the collusion strategies a misaligned AI might use to subvert untrusted monitoring. We develop a taxonomy covering passive self-recognition, causal collusion (hiding pre-shared signals), acausal collusion (hiding signals via Schelling points), and combined strategies. We create a safety case sketch to clearly present our argument, explicitly state our assumptions, and highlight unsolved challenges. We identify conditions under which passive self-recognition could be a more effective collusion strategy than those studied previously. Our work builds towards more robust evaluations of untrusted monitoring.

cs.AI↗