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arXiv · 2412.00424

FairSort: Learning to Fair Rank for Personalized Recommendations in Two-Sided Platforms

Abstract

Traditional recommendation systems focus on maximizing user satisfaction by suggesting their favourite items. This user-centric approach may lead to unfair exposure distribution among the providers. On the contrary, a provider-centric design might become unfair to the users. Therefore, this paper proposes a re-ranking model FairSort to find a trade-off solution among user-side fairness, provider-side fairness, and personalized recommendations utility. Previous works habitually treat this issue as a knapsack problem, incorporating both-side fairness as constraints. In this paper, we adopt a novel perspective, treating each recommendation list as a runway rather than a knapsack. In this perspective, each item on the runway gains a velocity and runs within a specific time, achieving re-ranking for both-side fairness. Meanwhile, we ensure the Minimum Utility Guarantee for personalized recommendations by designing a Binary Search approach. This can provide more reliable recommendations compared to the conventional greedy strategy based on the knapsack problem. We further broaden the applicability of FairSort, designing two versions for online and offline recommendation scenarios. Theoretical analysis and extensive experiments on real-world datasets indicate that FairSort can ensure more reliable personalized recommendations while considering fairness for both the provider and user.

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BibTeXRIS

Guoli Wu, Zhiyong Feng, Shizhan Chen, Hongyue Wu, Xiao Xue, Jianmao Xiao, Guodong Fan, Hongqi Chen, Jingyu Li. 2024-12-08. FairSort: Learning to Fair Rank for Personalized Recommendations in Two-Sided Platforms. https://doi.org/10.1109/tkde.2024.3509912

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