Statistical Impossibility and Possibility of Aligning LLMs with Human Preferences: From Condorcet Paradox to Nash Equilibrium

Abstract

Aligning large language models (LLMs) with diverse human preferences is critical for ensuring fairness and informed outcomes when deploying these models for decision-making. In this paper, we seek to uncover fundamental statistical limits concerning aligning LLMs with human preferences, with a focus on the probabilistic representation of human preferences and the preservation of diverse preferences in aligned LLMs. We first show that human preferences can be represented by a reward model if and only if the preference among LLM-generated responses is free of any Condorcet cycle. Moreover, we prove that Condorcet cycles exist with probability converging to one exponentially fast under a general probabilistic preference model called the Luce model, thereby demonstrating the impossibility of fully aligning human preferences using reward-based approaches such as reinforcement learning from human feedback. Next, we explore the conditions under which LLMs would employ mixed strategies -- meaning they do not collapse to a single response -- when aligned in the limit using a non-reward-based approach, such as Nash learning from human feedback. We identify a necessary and sufficient condition for mixed strategies: the absence of a response that is preferred over all others by a majority. As a blessing, we prove that this condition holds with high probability under the Luce model, thereby highlighting the statistical possibility of preserving minority preferences without explicit regularization in aligning LLMs.