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arXiv · 2503.16126

Income Inequality, Food Aid, and 'Zero Hunger': Evaluating Effectiveness During Lula's Administration

Bo Wu
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Abstract

Income inequality has been an important social issue that has attracted widespread attention. Taking the Zero Hunger Program in Brazil as a case study, this study analyzes the impact of policy changes on the income distribution of the Brazilian population during the implementation of the program using a breakpoint regression approach. The data for the study come from a variety of sources, including the Brazilian Ministry of Development, Social Assistance and the Family, and are analyzed using detailed descriptive statistics from the CEIC Brazil In-Depth Database. The results of the study show that during the Lula administration, Brazil's Zero Hunger Program substantially reduced income inequality, provided more substantial income security for the poor, and reduced the income gap between the rich and the poor. In terms of gender differences, the program led to a larger increase in the income of the male labor force at the right age compared to the female labor force, further highlighting the positive impact of the policy on the male labor force. These results are further confirmed by sensitivity analysis and provide useful lessons for subsequent policy formulation. This study's deep dive into the effects of the Zero Hunger program provides a valuable contribution to academic social science research and policy development.

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Bo Wu. 2025-03-20. Income Inequality, Food Aid, and 'Zero Hunger': Evaluating Effectiveness During Lula's Administration. https://arxiv.org/abs/2503.16126

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