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arXiv · 2504.15790

Microstructure and Manipulation: Quantifying Pump-and-Dump Dynamics in Cryptocurrency Markets

Abstract

Building on our prior threshold-based analysis of six months of Poloniex trading data, we have extended both the temporal span and granularity of our study by incorporating minute-level OHLCV records for 1021 tokens around each confirmed pump-and-dump event. First, we algorithmically identify the accumulation phase, marking the initial and final insider volume spikes, and observe that 70% of pre-event volume transacts within one hour of the pump announcement. Second, we compute conservative lower bounds on insider profits under both a single-point liquidation at 70% of peak and a tranche-based strategy (selling 20% at 50%, 30% at 60%, and 50% at 80% of peak), yielding median returns above 100% and upper-quartile returns exceeding 2000%. Third, by unfolding the full pump structure and integrating social-media verification (e.g., Telegram announcements), we confirm numerous additional events that eluded our initial model. We also categorize schemes into "pre-accumulation" versus "on-the-spot" archetypes-insights that sharpen detection algorithms, inform risk assessments, and underpin actionable strategies for real-time market-integrity enforcement.

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BibTeXRIS

Mahya Karbalaii. 2025-04-22. Microstructure and Manipulation: Quantifying Pump-and-Dump Dynamics in Cryptocurrency Markets. https://arxiv.org/abs/2504.15790

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