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arXiv · 2510.20930

Security Logs to ATT&CK Insights: Leveraging LLMs for High-Level Threat Understanding and Cognitive Trait Inference

Abstract

Understanding adversarial behavior in cybersecurity has traditionally relied on high-level intelligence reports and manual interpretation of attack chains. However, real-time defense requires the ability to infer attacker intent and cognitive strategy directly from low-level system telemetry such as intrusion detection system (IDS) logs. In this paper, we propose a novel framework that leverages large language models (LLMs) to analyze Suricata IDS logs and infer attacker actions in terms of MITRE ATT&CK techniques. Our approach is grounded in the hypothesis that attacker behavior reflects underlying cognitive biases such as loss aversion, risk tolerance, or goal persistence that can be extracted and modeled through careful observation of log sequences. This lays the groundwork for future work on behaviorally adaptive cyber defense and cognitive trait inference. We develop a strategy-driven prompt system to segment large amounts of network logs data into distinct behavioral phases in a highly efficient manner, enabling the LLM to associate each phase with likely techniques and underlying cognitive motives. By mapping network-layer events to high-level attacker strategies, our method reveals how behavioral signals such as tool switching, protocol transitions, or pivot patterns correspond to psychologically meaningful decision points. The results demonstrate that LLMs can bridge the semantic gap between packet-level logs and strategic intent, offering a pathway toward cognitive-adaptive cyber defense. Keywords: Cognitive Cybersecurity, Large Language Models (LLMs), Cyberpsychology, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), MITRE ATT&CK, Cognitive Biases

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Soham Hans, Stacy Marsella, Sophia Hirschmann, Nikolos Gurney. 2025-10-23. Security Logs to ATT&CK Insights: Leveraging LLMs for High-Level Threat Understanding and Cognitive Trait Inference. https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.20930

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