Search arXivSearch

arXiv · 2512.02690

Monotone Near-Zero-Sum Games: A Generalization of Convex-Concave Minimax

Abstract

Zero-sum and non-zero-sum (aka general-sum) games are relevant in a wide range of applications. While general non-zero-sum games are computationally hard, researchers focus on the special class of monotone games for gradient-based algorithms. However, there is a substantial gap between the gradient complexity of monotone zero-sum and monotone general-sum games. Moreover, in many practical scenarios of games the zero-sum assumption needs to be relaxed. To address these issues, we define a new intermediate class of monotone near-zero-sum games that contains monotone zero-sum games as a special case. Then, we present a novel algorithm that transforms the near-zero-sum games into a sequence of zero-sum subproblems, improving the gradient-based complexity for the class. Finally, we demonstrate the applicability of this new class to model practical scenarios of games motivated from the literature.

Explore related subjects

Keep this discovery

Explore connections, maps & timelines

BibTeXRIS

Ruichen Luo, Sebastian U. Stich, Krishnendu Chatterjee. 2025-12-02. Monotone Near-Zero-Sum Games: A Generalization of Convex-Concave Minimax. https://arxiv.org/abs/2512.02690

Cite the original work for its findings. Save a collection to share your selection of sources.

KEEP EXPLORING

Related papers

Learning in Structured Stackelberg Games

We initiate the study of structured Stackelberg games, a novel form of strategic interaction between a leader and a follower where contextual information can be predictive of the follower's (unknown) type. Motivated by applications such as security games and AI safety, we show how this additional structure can help the leader learn a utility-maximizing policy in both the online and distributional settings. In the online setting, we first prove that standard learning-theoretic measures of complexity do not characterize the difficulty of the leader's learning task. Notably, we find that there exists a learning-theoretic measure of complexity, analogous to the Littlestone dimension in online classification, that tightly characterizes the leader's instance-optimal regret. We term this the Stackelberg-Littlestone dimension, and leverage it to provide a provably optimal online learning algorithm. In the distributional setting, we provide analogous results by showing that two new dimensions control the sample complexity upper- and lower-bound.

cs.GT

Equilibrium and Infeasibility: A new solution concept for games

Addressing infeasibility in non-cooperative games has become an important topic, as many problems across different applications face this issue. In this paper, we propose a new solution concept for generalized games with possibly infeasible individual constraints. A solution is defined as the limit of a sequence of generalized Nash equilibria induced by games with penalty terms relaxing the individual constraints. Existence is established for a broad range of games and we provide conditions allowing to characterize a $ψ$-penalized solution as a strategy profile maximizing every player's utility over all her penalty minimizing strategies. A variation of Divide-the-Dollar serves as an illustrative example. We further establish the compatibility with the GNE and the solution to the Nash bargaining.

cs.GT

Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibria of Plurality Voting with Abstention: a PSPACE-Completeness Result for Restricted Ballots

We consider sequential Plurality elections in which each voter may abstain or vote for a single candidate. Each voter assigns utilities to all candidates; for each voter, this induces a (weak) order over the candidates. Ties are resolved uniformly at random, and voting has a small positive cost, so that a voter prefers to abstain when their vote cannot change the election outcome. We consider a variant of this model where, for each voter, we additionally specify a prefix of her ranking, so that she is only allowed to vote for a candidate from that prefix (or abstain). We prove that for this variant of the model, deciding whether a designated candidate is among the election winners in a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the associated extensive-form game is PSPACE-complete. This partially resolves an open problem from the work of Desmedt and Elkind [2010].

cs.GT