Search arXivSearch

arXiv · 2603.06406

Temporal Network Creation Games: The Impact of Flexible Labels

Abstract

A crucial aspect of research is understanding how real-world networks, such as transportation and information networks, are formed. A prominent model for such networks was introduced by \cite{fabrikant_network_2003} and extended by \cite{bilo_temporal_2023}, incorporating temporal graphs to better represent real-world networks. In this model, there is a given host graph with $n$ agents (represented by nodes) and time labels on the edges. Each agent can establish connections by purchasing edges. This makes the edges present at the time steps given by the time labels of the host graph. The goal of each agent is to reach as many other agents as possible while minimizing the number of edges bought. However, this model makes the simplifying assumption that each edge comes with predetermined time steps. We address this deficiency by extending the model of Bilo et al. \cite{bilo_temporal_2023} to allow agents to purchase edges and to decide when they appear. To capture a variety of real-world applications, we study two reachability models and several cost functions based on the label an agent assigns to an edge. For these settings, we provide proofs of existence of Nash equilibria, as well as lower and upper bounds on the Price of Anarchy and Price of Stability.

Explore related subjects

Keep this discovery

Explore connections, maps & timelines

BibTeXRIS

Hans Gawendowicz, Nicolas Klodt, Aleksandrs Morgensterns, George Skretas. 2026-03-06. Temporal Network Creation Games: The Impact of Flexible Labels. https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.06406

Cite the original work for its findings. Save a collection to share your selection of sources.

KEEP EXPLORING

Related papers

Learning in Structured Stackelberg Games

We initiate the study of structured Stackelberg games, a novel form of strategic interaction between a leader and a follower where contextual information can be predictive of the follower's (unknown) type. Motivated by applications such as security games and AI safety, we show how this additional structure can help the leader learn a utility-maximizing policy in both the online and distributional settings. In the online setting, we first prove that standard learning-theoretic measures of complexity do not characterize the difficulty of the leader's learning task. Notably, we find that there exists a learning-theoretic measure of complexity, analogous to the Littlestone dimension in online classification, that tightly characterizes the leader's instance-optimal regret. We term this the Stackelberg-Littlestone dimension, and leverage it to provide a provably optimal online learning algorithm. In the distributional setting, we provide analogous results by showing that two new dimensions control the sample complexity upper- and lower-bound.

cs.GT

Equilibrium and Infeasibility: A new solution concept for games

Addressing infeasibility in non-cooperative games has become an important topic, as many problems across different applications face this issue. In this paper, we propose a new solution concept for generalized games with possibly infeasible individual constraints. A solution is defined as the limit of a sequence of generalized Nash equilibria induced by games with penalty terms relaxing the individual constraints. Existence is established for a broad range of games and we provide conditions allowing to characterize a $ψ$-penalized solution as a strategy profile maximizing every player's utility over all her penalty minimizing strategies. A variation of Divide-the-Dollar serves as an illustrative example. We further establish the compatibility with the GNE and the solution to the Nash bargaining.

cs.GT

Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibria of Plurality Voting with Abstention: a PSPACE-Completeness Result for Restricted Ballots

We consider sequential Plurality elections in which each voter may abstain or vote for a single candidate. Each voter assigns utilities to all candidates; for each voter, this induces a (weak) order over the candidates. Ties are resolved uniformly at random, and voting has a small positive cost, so that a voter prefers to abstain when their vote cannot change the election outcome. We consider a variant of this model where, for each voter, we additionally specify a prefix of her ranking, so that she is only allowed to vote for a candidate from that prefix (or abstain). We prove that for this variant of the model, deciding whether a designated candidate is among the election winners in a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the associated extensive-form game is PSPACE-complete. This partially resolves an open problem from the work of Desmedt and Elkind [2010].

cs.GT