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arXiv · 2604.06860

Personalization as a Game: Equilibrium-Guided Generative Modeling for Physician Behavior in Pharmaceutical Engagement

Abstract

We present \textbf{EGPF} (Equilibrium-Guided Personalization Framework), a mathematically rigorous architecture unifying Bayesian game theory, category theory, information theory, and generative AI for hyper-personalized physician engagement in the pharmaceutical domain. Our framework models the pharma--physician interaction as an incomplete-information Bayesian game where physician behavioral types are inferred via functorial mappings from observational categories, equilibrium strategies guide content generation through large language models (LLMs), and information-theoretic feedback loops ensure adaptive recalibration. We formalize behavior composition through category-theoretic functors, natural transformations, and monoidal structures, enabling modular, composable physician archetypes that respect structural invariants under domain shift. We introduce a novel \textit{Rate-Distortion Equilibrium} (RDE) criterion that bounds the personalization--privacy tradeoff, an \textit{Evolutionary Game Dynamics} layer for population-level behavior modeling, a \textit{Mechanism Design} module for incentive-compatible engagement, and a \textit{Sheaf-Theoretic} extension for multi-scale behavioral consistency. We prove convergence of our iterative belief-update mechanism at rate $O(\frac{K\log K}{t \cdot C_{\min}})$ and establish finite-sample regret bounds. Extensive experiments on synthetic pharma datasets and a real-world HCP engagement pilot demonstrate a 34\% improvement in engagement prediction (AUC) and 28\% lift in content relevance scores compared to state-of-the-art methods.

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BibTeXRIS

Suyash Mishra. 2026-04-08. Personalization as a Game: Equilibrium-Guided Generative Modeling for Physician Behavior in Pharmaceutical Engagement. https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.06860

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