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arXiv · 2605.05138

Executable World Models for ARC-AGI-3 in the Era of Coding Agents

Sergey Rodionov
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Abstract

We evaluate an initial coding-agent system for ARC-AGI-3 in which the agent maintains an executable Python world model, verifies it against previous observations, refactors it toward simpler abstractions as a practical proxy for an MDL-like simplicity bias, and plans through the model before acting. The system is intentionally direct: it uses a scripted controller, predefined world-model interfaces, verifier programs, and a plan executor, but no hand-coded game-specific logic. The agent-facing prompts, workspace, and controller contain no game-specific code, game-specific prompts, hand-coded heuristics, hidden solutions, or other game-specific information; the same agent and prompts are used across games. Because the coding agent has broad system access, we audit unintended information channels, describe earlier vulnerable harnesses, and explain how the current harness closes observed leakage channels while reducing benchmark-specific information exposure. We report results on the 25 public ARC-AGI-3 games. Each playthrough starts from a fresh agent instance and clean workspace, with no access to files or conversation state from earlier playthroughs. With GPT-5.5 high reasoning effort, the agent fully solved 15 games and achieved a mean per-game RHAE of 58.12%. With GPT-5.4 high reasoning effort, it fully solved 8 games and achieved a mean per-game RHAE of 41.29%. Performance on the private validation set, which is not yet available to us, remains to be tested. Overall, the results provide preliminary evidence that verifier-driven executable world models are a promising approach for ARC-AGI-3 agents. Full run artifacts are released with the code at https://github.com/astroseger/arc-3-agents-baseline1.

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BibTeXRIS

Sergey Rodionov. 2026-06-06. Executable World Models for ARC-AGI-3 in the Era of Coding Agents. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-032-33195-3_15

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