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arXiv · 2605.18887

Valuing Winners: When and How to Correct for Selection Bias in Randomized Experiments

Abstract

Decision-makers often deploy the best-performing treatment from a randomized experiment, creating a winner's curse: selection favors treatments whose observed outcomes are high partly because of statistical noise, so the naïve estimate of the winner is upward biased. We distinguish two forms of winner's curse, bias relative to the true best treatment (global) and bias relative to the selected treatment's true mean (selective), and link them to regret from deploying a suboptimal treatment. This framework defines seven decision-relevant evaluation targets: mean bias, mean squared error, and confidence interval coverage for the global and selective winner's curse, and mean regret. We then show that methods that perform well on one target can perform poorly on others, so corrections should be matched to the manager's objective. Across simulations with varying effect sizes, multiple-arm settings, and data calibrated to an online A/B testing platform, no method dominates uniformly: the plug-in estimator performs best when treatment differences are large, cross-fitting performs best when treatments are similar, and resampling methods often achieve low mean squared error for moderate differences. We also introduce an adaptive empirical likelihood procedure that delivers asymptotically valid confidence intervals across settings without the tuning sensitivity of resampling-based methods.

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BibTeXRIS

Ron Berman, Walter W. Zhang, Hangcheng Zhao. 2026-05-16. Valuing Winners: When and How to Correct for Selection Bias in Randomized Experiments. https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.18887

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