The Cognitive Kardashev Scale: Quantifying the Material Envelope of Civilisational Computation

Sachin Sharma

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arXiv · 2605.22840

The Cognitive Kardashev Scale: Quantifying the Material Envelope of Civilisational Computation

Sachin Sharma

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Abstract

How much thinking can a civilisation do? Kardashev ranked civilisations by the energy they command. This paper borrows his ladder and asks how much machine cognition each rung could support. The arithmetic is deliberately simple. A civilisation has some total power. Only a fraction of that can be spared for computing, and each joule spent buys computation at whatever efficiency the hardware of the day has reached. The product of the three sets a ceiling on machine thought. To keep the resulting quantities intelligible, I express them in units of the human brain's own processing rate, as a rough yardstick rather than a claim about minds. Calibrating the ceiling against present-day supercomputers and AI accelerators led me to two conclusions I did not expect at the outset. Even today's energy supply could support far more machine cognition than humanity actually uses, so physical capacity is not what binds. And whether energy or hardware efficiency becomes the constraint over the coming decade turns on engineering choices that have not yet been made. On the question that may matter most, who gets access to the cognition it describes, the scale is silent. That is a matter of political economy, and the calibration is offered as an input to that debate.

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Sachin Sharma. 2026-07-21. The Cognitive Kardashev Scale: Quantifying the Material Envelope of Civilisational Computation. https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.22840

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