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arXiv · 2606.00930

A Circuit, Not The Circuit: Non-Unique Causal Localisation of the Mamba-2 State Sink

Yuhang Jiang·Bowen Zhang
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Abstract

Mechanistic interpretability routinely reads a probe and labels its top-activating units as the circuit executing the computation. We test the move in Mamba, on the state sink: the selective state-space analogue of the Transformer attention sink, where the Delta-gate fires disproportionately on boundary tokens such as BOS and newline. At Mamba-1 channel granularity the probe's units carry the causal effect. At Mamba-2 head granularity the label-to-locus link breaks in three ways. The causal set is not unique: a near-disjoint set of top-activation heads, sharing almost none of the specialists, matches or exceeds their ablation effect. Representation does not track function: dual heads, a quarter to over a third of all heads, respond alike to BOS and newline yet do not reproduce the specialists' causal profile. And the effect dissociates by intervention surface: perturbing the input-dependent Delta the probe reads moves the loss by at most 0.16 nats, while suppressing the same heads' output moves it by 1.5 to 7.3 nats. The heads still matter behaviourally, dropping needle-retrieval success on a RULER-style probe from 30/30 to 0/30 at 1024 context on both flagship checkpoints. A representational signature in a selective state-space model thus marks a behaviourally important head set without pinning down the circuit: a single probe recovers a circuit, not the circuit.

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Yuhang Jiang, Bowen Zhang. 2026-08-25. A Circuit, Not The Circuit: Non-Unique Causal Localisation of the Mamba-2 State Sink. https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.00930

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