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arXiv · 2606.07285

Improved Lower Bounds for Proportionally Fair Clustering

Abstract

We study proportionally fair clustering, where a set of $k$ centers must be chosen from a metric space to represent $n$ agents, and no sufficiently large group of agents should be collectively underrepresented. One of the central notions of fairness in this setting is the $α$-core. The existence of clusterings in the $(1+\sqrt{2})$-core was established by Chen et al. [2019], who also showed instances where the $α$-core is empty for every $α< 2$. Closing this gap has remained an open problem for seven years. We make progress from the lower-bound side by providing an instance whose $α$-core is empty for every $α< 2.1508$. Our techniques rely on establishing connections between variants of the core, namely the Hare core and the Droop core; reducing the search for optimal empty-core instances to a highly structured family of clustering instances; and using a Mixed Integer Linear Program (MILP) to search for optimal lower-bound instances within this reduced space. Using this framework, we also determine tight bounds for Droop quota clustering instances with a small number of possible candidate centers and a single center to be selected. For each number of centers $m \in \{3,4,5,6\}$, we give the exact threshold $α_m^*$ such that an $α_m^*$-core clustering always exists, while for every $α< α_m^*$ there is an instance with $m$ centers whose $α$-core is empty. Although these values were originally found through computer-aided search, we also provide direct proofs that do not rely on MILP certificates.

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BibTeXRIS

Benjamin Cookson, Eva Deltl, Yeeseok Oh. 2026-06-05. Improved Lower Bounds for Proportionally Fair Clustering. https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.07285

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