Convergence of Replicator Dynamics in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Restarts

Abstract

We investigate a population of self-interested agents playing a repeated Prisoner's Dilemma under the trigger-restart mechanism. Under such a mechanism, agents play a sequence of symmetric games with their partner, and restart the interaction if their actions disagree. Our work focuses on the convergence of replicator dynamics in a well-mixed population of agents, where the emergence of cooperation is challenged by the individual incentive for exploitation. Formulating the corresponding parametrised normal-form game, with agents each adopting a length-m strategy sequence, we show that increasing the strategy length enables cooperation to emerge and stabilise. We provide exact convergence guarantees for restricted strategy lengths and, in the general payoff configuration, provide the necessary parametric conditions for the stability of cooperative strategies. By deriving an exact formula for the number of stable sequences, we find structural properties necessary for stability, as agents must learn to initially defect - the so-called "hazing period" - before cooperating indefinitely. Our analysis shows that, while optimal cooperative sequences exist, agents favour less-optimal sequences with a longer hazing period, which possess larger basins of attraction.