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arXiv · 2606.19517

Do Prediction Markets Match Option Prices? Bitcoin Threshold Evidence from Binance and Polymarket

Abstract

The digitization of financial markets has produced two classes of platforms that price, in principle, the same state - contingent payoffs: centralized crypto-option exchanges and blockchain-based prediction markets. This paper provides the first option-implied benchmark test of prediction-market pricing for cryptocurrency threshold contracts. For each hour in a matched sample, we compare the Polymarket Yes price with the discounted risk-neutral binary value implied by a listed Binance call option on the same underlying, strike, and maturity, and study the gap between them. In the main September 2023 Bitcoin contract, the mean pricing gap equals 5.6 percentage points across 214 hourly observations (t = 6.46, p < 10^{-9}). Pooling three Binance-compatible Bitcoin threshold markets yields a mean gap of 6.3 percentage points across 287 observations, robust to HAC and block-bootstrap inference. The gap is persistent - with an AR(1) half-life of roughly four hours - yet mean-reverting, consistent with slow information transmission between segmented venues rather than mechanical noise. Cross-sectional regressions reveal that the wedge is largest at low option-implied probabilities and long maturities, a pattern consistent with speculative demand for prediction-market contracts rather than measurement error. A delta-hedged arbitrage proxy remains profitable after conservative transaction costs, though with marginal statistical precision. A Deribit extension on the same three Bitcoin contracts produces a larger pooled gap of 11 percentage points, while a smaller Ethereum exercise yields mixed evidence. The results demonstrate that digital fragmentation of financial markets generates systematic, persistent pricing wedges even for economically identical payoffs.

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BibTeXRIS

Victoria Portnaya. 2026-06-17. Do Prediction Markets Match Option Prices? Bitcoin Threshold Evidence from Binance and Polymarket. https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.19517

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