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arXiv · 2607.10552

Which Wallpaper Groups Arise from Tiled Games?

Abstract

Which discrete symmetry groups can arise from strategic interaction? We tile the plane with copies of a bimatrix game's support complex, joined by controlled boundary rules, and show that all seventeen wallpaper groups act on the resulting covers: explicit generators, each a machine-verified graph automorphism, every realization certified as the exact toroidal quotient, with types identified by a crystallographic recognizer in exact rational arithmetic and cross-validated in GAP. A three-line lemma turns the classical symmorphic/non-symmorphic distinction into a lattice classification: realizations whose translations contain the full tile lattice exist precisely for the thirteen symmorphic groups, and the four non-symmorphic groups are realized at translation-lattice index exactly two, the minimum possible: the tile is the glide's half-step. Two computational tracks accompany the construction. On the graph track, quotienting a straight cover by its translations recovers the tile exactly, $\beq(M/\calT)=\beq(K)$, and swap boundaries add exactly $\binom m2$, independent of payoffs and of cover size. On the game track, detecting a duplicated-strategy cover is a linear-time payoff scan, one tile solution folds to a full translation orbit of cover equilibria, and the tiled correlated-equilibrium system has dimension exactly $r(d-q)+q$, with expansion impossible. The polymatrix cover then carries the symmetry outright: every wallpaper action, glides included, is a group of genuine game automorphisms, equilibria collapse along any symmetry subgroup to a folded fixed-point problem, and a decorated refinement has game automorphism group exactly the toroidal wallpaper group.

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Matthew Fried. 2026-07-12. Which Wallpaper Groups Arise from Tiled Games?. https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.10552

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