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arXiv · 2607.18492

Breaking Network Densification Limits with Distributed Cooperative Massive Access (DCMA)

Abstract

In this work, we investigate the performance of the distributed cooperative massive access (DCMA) framework in large-scale network setups by incorporating stochastic geometry modeling. A partially centralized cell-free cloud-radio access (C-RAN) architecture is considered where remote radio heads (RRHs) decode transmitted messages and cooperate with each other to enhance system performance. Specifically, they can share decoded messages via feedback links, allowing receivers to cancel inter-user interference through successive interference cancellation (SIC), thus improving the decoding capabilities of the system. For such a network, we propose a novel synergetic decoding algorithm that efficiently resolves the assignment and message sharing routing for each user while accounting for practical network constraints. Furthermore, using game theory, we develop a merge-and-split algorithm with lexicographic preference to solve the problem of minimizing the RRHs utilized without compromising the performance. Simulation results show that the proposed framework significantly outperforms systems that do not implement SIC or take advantage of the cooperation between RRHs in terms of outage probability. Finally, we evaluate the performance of the proposed algorithms and validate their efficiency.

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BibTeXRIS

Christoforos I. Dallas, Apostolos A. Tegos, Sotiris A. Tegos, Yue Xiao, George K. Karagiannidis, Panagiotis D. Diamantoulakis. 2026-07-20. Breaking Network Densification Limits with Distributed Cooperative Massive Access (DCMA). https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.18492

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