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arXiv · 2608.02559

House-monotone multi-level apportionment has logarithmic quota discrepancy

Abstract

Multi-level apportionment allocates integer seats through a hierarchy of groups. Schmidt-Kraepelin, Suksompong, and Wijaya proved that, at every fixed house size, lower and upper quota can be satisfied simultaneously; they also constructed house-monotone rules satisfying either quota separately. They left open whether one rule can satisfy lower quota, upper quota, and house monotonicity together, even when quota is required only relative to the root. We give a negative answer. For a full binary comb with $D$ equally entitled leaves, every house-monotone allocation sequence induces a sequence of seat recipients. Quota for the nested comb groups would force every grid-aligned prefix discrepancy to be below one. A midpoint embedding then bounds the full interval discrepancy by this quantity plus $1/2$, contradicting Schmidt's logarithmic lower bound. Conversely, a binary van der Corput seat schedule has comb-prefix error at most $\log D/(3\log 2)+1$. Thus the optimal worst-case error on the comb is $Θ(\log D)$, and for sufficiently large finite $D$ no house-monotone quota rule exists. The proof isolates a static--dynamic gap: each house size admits a quota-feasible allocation, but the feasible allocations cannot be embedded into one monotone path. In quantization language, the result characterizes the order of the embedded-quantization penalty for progressive one-hot rounding on the comb.

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BibTeXRIS

Lav R. Varshney. 2026-08-05. House-monotone multi-level apportionment has logarithmic quota discrepancy. https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.02559

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