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arXiv · 2608.03722

When Outputs Disperse, Does Epistemic Revision Follow? A Black-Box Diagnostic for Machine Collectives

Molood Arman
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Abstract

Collective intelligence research treats disagreement as evidence of epistemic diversity: if agents express different views, the group should retain capacity to revise. In LLM collectives this proxy can break: agents can produce diverse-looking arguments while preserving the same conclusion. We operationalize dispersion-revision coupling: the degree to which an intervention that verifiably increases the dispersion of a collective's outputs in embedding space is accompanied by genuine revision of its epistemic stance rather than premise-preserving reformulation. The diagnostic is black-box: it operates on generated text alone and makes no claims about the internal representations of the generating models. Two channels are measured independently: an output channel, the Coherence Index (CI), verifies that the intervention changed output dispersion; an epistemic channel, per-turn stance annotation, measures whether the collective revised. We propose CI with the Meta-Predictive Clarity System (MPCS), which inserts a Re-Differentiation Protocol (RDP) when outputs over-converge, as a reusable method for estimating this coupling regime. We evaluate five-agent collectives from two configurations (gpt-4o-mini and gemini-2.5-flash; 310 paired episodes per condition). On gpt-4o-mini, conditional dissent improves false-premise recovery by +17.7 points (p<1e-6) while static persona diversity harms recovery (-8.1, p=.007). On gemini-2.5-flash, the same intervention at a comparable budget yields no gain (26.1% vs 27.1%, p=.84) despite a verified dispersion drop; the two treatment effects differ from each other (z=3.79, p<.001). Mechanism tagging shows Gemini preserves the false premise via intra-framework dissent: 94% of tagged post-RDP responses reformulate rather than concede (vs 24% on GPT). We recommend reporting per-intervention stance shift and premise-preservation rate alongside accuracy.

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Molood Arman. 2026-08-05. When Outputs Disperse, Does Epistemic Revision Follow? A Black-Box Diagnostic for Machine Collectives. https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.03722

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