Security Games on Series-Parallel Attack Graphs with Adaptive Attackers

Abstract

We study security games on attack graphs, where an adaptive attacker seeks to reach a target by sequentially attempting stochastic controls along the current attack frontier, while a defender allocates limited resources across controls to delay compromise. The attacker may choose among exponentially many attack routes and freely pivot between them as successes and failures are observed, yielding an exponentially large space of contingent attack policies. For any fixed defender allocation, we show that an optimal attacker policy on a two-terminal series-parallel attack graph is an index policy: at each step, the attacker selects an available control with the largest value of an extension of the classical Gittins index. The indices and the resulting attacker best response can be computed in polynomial time, without explicitly enumerating attack paths or contingent policies. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first optimal index characterization for adaptive attackers in security games on general series-parallel attack graphs. We further develop efficient algorithms for computing the attacker's exact utility and an exact defender subgradient, enabling deterministic first-order optimization of defensive resource allocations without sampling attack trajectories. Our framework strictly generalizes prior approaches restricted to parallel chains and out-trees, while exploiting the compositional structure of series-parallel graphs to support interpretable attacker policies and parallel computation across independent subgraphs. Experiments demonstrate that the resulting methods scale substantially better than naive explicit-state approaches while producing effective defensive allocations.